Co. New York. 2007. pp.213.

Reviewed by Mirza Asmer Beg

Zahid Hussain is a journalist, who has attempted to study the relationship between

religious extremists and the ISI (Pakistan’s military intelligence agency) which led

to the evolution of a culture of intolerant extremism in Pakistan. He has studied

the geo-political significance of Pakistan to the US, in its war against communism

in Afghanistan, and in its ongoing global war against terrorism.

He says that extremism in Pakistan was initially directed towards Afghanistan and

Kashmir in India, but after Pakistan joined America’s war against terrorism, the

State turned against the extremists, consequently inviting their wrath. The

challenges facing Pakistan and Musharraf have been detailed, to bring out the

various aspects of the struggle with radical Islam, as it is unfolding in Pakistan.

The author argues that when the Soviets entered Afghanistan, the Americans relied

almost entirely on the ISI to allocate weapons to the mujahideen groups, this

provided the ISI with almost total control over the operations in Afghanistan and

made it very powerful. The resistance in Afghanistan was projected as a part of

global jihad against communism. General Zia cleverly used Islam to consolidate his

power and legitimize his rule. The effort to Islamise the state and society had

American blessings. However, once the Soviet Union collapsed, the US lost interest

in this surreptitious game. But the immense power which the army in Pakistan had

acquired, continued to haunt the democratic leaders who came to power subsequently,

and whenever they tried to clip its wings, they were unceremoniously sacked.

The events of September 11 in the US, made Pakistan once again important for US

policy makers in their fight against global terrorism. Pakistan was forced to join

this war, and it meant that it had to fight those very forces which it had nurtured,

since the early eighties. This drastic shift in policy was decided upon by

Musharraf, without consulting even the junta which along with him had ruled the

country since 1999, when he captured power. He slowly eased out those officers who

were against this shift and appointed his loyalists in their place, and became the

sole holder of power in Pakistan. He banned five Islamic extremist groups and warned

that no group would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of religion. This

pitted Musharraf against his former clients and they became his enemy number one.

However, some elements in the state security apparatus continued to clandestinely

support the extremist elements.

All through the eighties and nineties, a significant difference between Pakistani

extremist groups and groups like Al Qaeda, was that while the former served as

instruments of Pakistan’s regional policy vis a vis Afghanistan and India, the

latter had the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate as their objective.

However, now some of the more radical Pakistani groups have close links with

transnational terrorists.

The author has also studied the madrasas in Pakistan. He argues that traditionally

they were centres of basic religious learning, mostly attached to local mosques.

“Many of the religious parties operating the madrasas turned to militancy courtesy

of the US-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan”(p.77)The number of madrasas also

multiplied with the rise of jihad culture. Government sources put their number at

13,000, with total enrolment close to 1.7 million.(p.79). They received huge funds

from Muslim countries as well as Pakistani expatriates. The US actively promoted

militancy and the culture of jihad. Special textbooks were published in Dari and

Pashto by the University of Nebraska-Omaha and funded by USAID with an aim to

promote jihadist values and military training. Millions of such books were

distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas.(p.80).

Zahid Hussain argues that religious sectarianism presented the most serious threat

to internal security of Pakistan. Non-Sunni sects felt increasingly threatened by

the Sunni orthodoxy propagated by the power of the state.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan foreign operatives fled from

there and looked to turn Pakistan in a new base for their terror operations. Given

this shift of the terror network to Pakistan, America had no option but to take help

from the Pakistani intelligence to fight these forces. Musharraf was forced to

launch an offensive against Al Qaeda  fugitives. However, he was not much successful

in curbing the spread of religious extremism in Pakistan, which continued to pose a

threat to domestic, regional and global security. Musharraf’s close alliance with

the US is another factor which has generated support for Islamic radicals in

Pakistan. Musharraf’s rule, says Zahid Hussain has intensified social, ethnic and

religious differences in Pakistani society, which could have disastrous consequences

in the times to come.

The author has also presented the story of Abdul Qadeer Khan- the father of

Pakistan’s nuclear programme, and his international network of secret nuclear trade,

in a very interesting style.

This book contains a wealth of information. However, it is weak on analysis. The

information has been presented in a narrative style, without subjecting it to a

rigorous analysis. It nevertheless is interesting to read and should be of great use

for researchers and students interested in this subject.

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