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The Philosophical Foundations of
Civilizational Dialogue
By Dr. Hans Köchler
Preliminary remarks
Upon the end of the East-West conflict
– when decades-old enemy stereotypes
along ideological lines had suddenly
vanished – a new paradigm has been
emerging from Western think tanks
for the categorization of international
relations, namely that of the "clash
of civilizations." The term was
originally coined by Bernard Lewis
in an essay analyzing the increasing
alienation between the Western and
Muslim world (1990).[1]
Samuel Huntington's treatise of
1993[2]
has taken up that theme, putting
it into a more general context.
His theses provoked worldwide controversies,
particularly between scholars in
the Western and Muslim world, and
also among Western philosophers
themselves. In the meantime, the
text has been perceived by many
as key document of a new hegemonial
discourse of the West: as expression
of a doctrine by which the propagators
of a "New World Order"[3]
strive to interpret even the tragic
events of September 11, 2001, as
part of an emerging global confrontation
between the self-declared "enlightened"
West and the supposed forces of
"fanaticism" and "irrationality."
In the eyes of many in the West,
Huntington's paradigm, in spite
of his own refutations,[4]
has been reinforced as a result
of global political developments
since that date. Francis Fukuyama's
earlier paradigm (1989) of the "end
of history" – predicting the victory
of Western "liberal" democracy over
other models of society[5]
– has been quickly replaced by the
more gloomy confrontational paradigm.
As regards the Islamic civilization,
which is perceived by many in the
West as a threat not just since
the end of the East-West conflict,[6]
the point has been made most drastically
by Bernard Lewis, the first to evoke
the theme of an almost inevitable
confrontation: "This is no less
than a clash of civilizations –
the perhaps irrational but surely
historic reaction of an ancient
rival against our Judeo-Christian
heritage, our secular present, and
the worldwide expansion of both.
It is crucially important that we
on our side should not be provoked
into an equally historic but also
equally irrational reaction against
that rival."[7]
Against this background of growing
political tension and increasing
alienation between East and West
along civilizational and particularly
religious lines, it is of utmost
importance to reflect upon the very
nature of human consciousness
which, in essence, requires dialogue
(the encounter with "the other")
in order to fully realize itself.
Apart from the epistemological relevance,
rethinking the philosophical foundations
of consciousness allows us to understand
the basic principles of dialogue
among civilizations, thus enabling
us to create an alternative paradigm
by which the human being of the
21st century[8]
will learn to understand himself
in a truly universal manner
as member of the one human race
and according to the structural
traits of the human mind that are
shared by the philosophia perennis
of virtually all civilizations.
As a philosopher with a background
of European (Graeco-Roman) philosophy,
I undertake to develop the theory
of civilizational dialogue by using
the concepts available in that particular
cultural context. Being aware of
the history of Eurocentrism, I will
try to avoid the "universalist"
mistakes of that tradition.[9]
However, the assumptions developed
here may equally be proven in the
framework of philosophical traditions
other than those presented in this
essay.
The dialectical nature of human
consciousness
Human consciousness is only possible
on the basis of a dialectical
relationship between subject
(ego) and object –
or, to put it in Fichtean terms
without adopting, however, Fichte's
idealistic ontology, between the
ego and the non-ego[10]:
that which is "opposed" to, or distinct
from, the subject as content of
its perception or practical self-realization.
The "intentionality" of the human
mind – as described by Franz Brentano[11]
and later by Edmund Husserl in his
phenomenology[12]
– is the core concept on which 20th
century European philosophy has
built its efforts to explain
how the human being exists
in the real world (in the sense
not only of perceiving the world
as something different from his
mind, but of positioning himself
as concrete existence in the "life-world,"[13]
as "being-in-the-world" as it was
later explained by Martin Heidegger[14]).
Intentionality of the mind (subject)
means its being directed towards
an object, or objects, which form
the content of its perception. The
subject understands itself
only through the object.
De-finitio, in its original
meaning, implies drawing the very
borders between a given entity and
that which is different from it.
When applied to the nature of the
human subject, this relationship
means that the ego can only fully
understand itself if it is able
to relate to that which is not
the self. Along the lines of G.W.F.
Hegel's dialectical philosophy,
the self-consciousness which is
characteristic of the human being
must be understood as synthesis
resulting from the juxtaposition
of the ego (as thesis) and
that which it encounters in the
life-world, the non-ego (which may
also appear in the form of an
alter ego), as antithesis.
This dialectical relationship is
the essence of critical thinking,
i.e. of an awareness of my self
in the sense of being able to look
at myself from the perspective of
the "other."
What applies to individual
consciousness, also applies (in
general-structural terms) to the
collective consciousness
as expressed in a particular civilization
or culture (if understood as a specific
expression or trait of a civilization).
What we have earlier called the
"cultural self-comprehension of
nations"[15]
is only possible on the basis of
this dialectical relationship between
a given civilization and those civilizational
or more specifically cultural, traditions
that are distinct from it,
i.e. that have developed their characteristics
independently of that civilization.
This level of critical consciousness,
being aware of its limitations,
may only be attained to the extent
that we are able and willing to
compare the system of our own "life-world"
to those systems that are different
from ours: it is the "other" (the
"object" in a more abstract sense,
even if it means a collective
subject such as a civilization)
that constitutes the precondition
for me being aware of myself as
an individual as well as
a member of a community. The same
structural rule applies to the shaping
of collective consciousness.
The human mind reaches mature self-awareness
essentially in the process of distinguishing
from itself, as the "subject," that
which is not the subject.
In this fundamentally dialectical
process lies the very essence of
reflection (as self-reflection).
As explained above, consciousness
is attained following the dialectical
interdependence between subject
and object: the more I am able to
perceive myself as being distinct
from other subjects ("alter
egos"), the more I will succeed
in defining my own position in the
life-world. This also applies to
the collective subject: a civilization
will only reach a mature state of
self-realization if it is in a position
to relate itself to other civilizational
systems, leaving behind any "idiosyncrasy"
or narrow-mindedness towards "the
other." To say it in the words of
modern hermeneutics: the wider the
subjective horizon of experience,
the easier a critical self‑comprehension
may be attained. Applying this to
one's own civilization and related
cultural sub-systems we arrive at
this point: In the very multitude
and variety of possible systems
of civilization we find the unique
chance of gaining a clearer and
more critical consciousness of our
own system.[16]
A certain structural similarity
of this interdependence to Hegelian
dialectics should, however, not
be construed as justifying a polemical
attitude towards perceptions of
the world that are different from
our own.
The hermenutics of civilizational dialogue
In order to interpret the dialectical
relationship of subject and object
in its concrete civilizational context,
we will now relate that concept
to modern philosophical hermeneutics
in more detail. If we apply Hans-Georg
Gadamer's universal hermeneutical
conception[17]
to the realm of civilizational awareness,
transcending the horizon of one's
own civilizational tradition is
the fundamental precondition for
a better understanding of that very
civilization. Selbstverständnis
(understanding of my self) is being
based on Fremdverständnis
(understanding of the other). If
one's own civilization (with its
specific cultural traditions)
is taken as an isolated phenomenon,
it has, in strictly philosophical
terms, less significance than if
this civilization is being related
to and, therefore, defined by distinct
civilizations. In this fact lies
what I call the cosmopolitan
dimension of civilization per
se. Only such an approach will
enable us to avoid getting entangled
in a false "hermeneutic circle,"
namely the circulus vitiosus
of self-affirmation of a given civilization
that has resorted to define itself
through exclusive reference to its
own Wirkungsgeschichte, i.e.
the very tradition on which it is
based.
Mature and responsible self‑comprehension
is only possible when we are able
and willing to go beyond the sphere
of influence of our own civilization's
history, thus transcending the paradigm
of an "insular" interpretation and
awareness of our own perception
of the world. The encounter with
traditions that are not just an
offspring of our own civilization,
but have developed in another framework
of Wirkungsgeschichte,[18]
is the conditio sine qua non
not only of critical self-awareness,
i.e. of a deeper philosophical understanding
of the essence of our civilization,
but of what today is called the
"dialogue among civilizations."
A kind of "skeptical" attitude towards
one's implicit understanding
of the world – i.e. an essentially
philosophical approach towards
one's civilization – is also indispensable
for the development of tolerance
towards other civilizations.
The hermeneutics of civilizational
self-comprehension leaves no room
for aggressive or hostile attitudes
towards that which is not the "self"
(in the individual as well as the
collective sense), but realizes
the human being's potential for
critical consciousness in a comprehensive
manner; it goes beyond the abstract
concept of philosophical "reflection"
by encompassing each individual's
civilizational background against
which it is alone able to shape
its identity as "being-in-the-world"
(In-der-Welt-Sein in the
Heideggerian sense).[19]
A philosophical, as distinct
from a merely sociological, foundation
of inter-civilizational dialogue,
in the sense of a hermeneutics
of inter-civilizational understanding,
has also remained a desideratum
under the circumstances of the modern
world (often characterized with
the terms "globalization" or "globality").[20]
The hermeneutics envisaged here
along the lines established by Gadamer's
Wahrheit und Methode (Truth
and Method) is one that does away
with the subjectivist and, for that
matter, individualistic approach
that has flourished for centuries
in a kind of symbiosis with colonialism
and more recently the "new-worldism"
of the West.
As stated above in regard to the
structure of human consciousness,
the "other" serves as the "corrective"
of one’s own understanding of the
world ("life-world" as defined in
Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology)
and system of values. In the context
of this comprehensive dialectic
of cultural awareness, the "other"
civilization is the essential precondition
of the very awareness of my own
civilization. This hermeneutic
necessity correlates to the
attitude of respect for the
other on an individual as well as
collective basis and tolerance
towards one another’s civilization.
Such an attitude is an indispensable
moral requirement for the
realization of any given civilization.
The ethical value of tolerance
constitutes a precondition for the
critical awareness of my self as
a social being and of my civilizational
background in the sense of Gadamer's
Gesamthorizont ("universal
horizon of understanding"). Thus,
this value is common to all civilizations.
However, in line with what was said
earlier referring to Hegelian dialectics,
the fact that I can define myself
only vis-à-vis the other
(as distinct from that which is
not myself) must not encourage any
over-assertive or hostile attitudes
towards that which is “alien” to
myself; on the contrary, it requires
respect for the other, his distinct
perception of reality, and cultural
value system.
Civilizational dialogue, therefore,
is based on a non-subjectivist
philosophy of the realization of
one’s own self through the encounter
with different traditions, cultural
expressions, value systems, and
life-styles. Contrary to what some
may assume, this is not a contradictio
in adjecto. Even if the subject
can never transcend itself completely
(i.e. view itself from an absolute,
or outside perspective), as is evidenced
in the Kantian and Husserlian notion
of the "pure transcendental subject,"[21]
the self-realization of the concrete
subject is achieved in what we call
a "non-subjectivist" way, in the
sense of genuinely relating to other
subjects.[22]
Those are perceived as offering
the individual a chance of enriching
his own social and cultural awareness,
not just as a “tool” to help me
define myself or help a given civilization
to understand itself more comprehensively
and develop its characteristics
more fully.
In our understanding, the approach
outlined here goes beyond the conceptual
framework of traditional European
hermeneutics as established by Wilhelm
Dilthey[23]
and further advanced by Hans-Georg
Gadamer in the context of Heidegger's
existential phenomenology.
However, Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics, an approach that
combines Heidegger's method of "existential
analysis" (Existenzialanalyse)
with Dilthey's classical hermeneutics,
may serve as a methodological basis
for a theory of cultural self-comprehension
as referred to in this essay. His
concept of Verständnishorizont
(horizon of understanding) includes
the specific socio-cultural environments
into which the concrete human being
is constantly integrated in the
course of his life. According to
this conception, a person’s understanding
of the world (in the meaning of
the "life-world," combining natural
and social reality) is the result
of a complex interaction of concrete
horizons of understanding that constantly
overlap. To describe this structure
of self-comprehension, which is
at the roots of cross-cultural understanding,
Gadamer coined the term Horizontverschmelzung
("fusion of horizons").[24]
A similar conception has been developed
by Ali A. Mazrui in the context
of applied social science. He states:
“How people view the world is greatly
conditioned by one or more cultural
paradigms to which they have been
exposed."[25]
Culture, in Mazrui’s conception,
provides “lenses of perception and
cognition”[26]
in the concrete social and historical
context.
According to Gadamer, the universal horizon of "my" understanding of the world
(Gesamthorizont) is constantly
being modified by the encounter
with other human realities in my
own individual "history," which
in turn is part of a larger history
of interacting civilizations. My
understanding of reality and of
myself as part of it is nothing
static; understanding (Verstehen)
of the self and the world (Lebenswelt)
is a dynamic process shaped by those
cultural perceptions which have
entered over a period of individual
or civilizational history my individual
horizon and the collective horizon
of the cultural community (civilization)
I belong to. The "cultural ego"
is not an insular entity that exists
in a world defined according to
one tradition only. Such exclusiveness
would be the end of any critical
understanding of one’s own Lebenswelt
and civilizational environment.
It would make tolerance towards
other cultures not only illusory,
but simply impossible.[27]
Beyond Eurocentrism? – Civilizational
dialogue and peaceful co-existence
among nations
Since the colonial era, the Western
world has been used to exporting
its civilization through its imperial
and colonial policies. All other
civilizations were measured by Western
standards based on the anthropocentric
and individualistic world view of
the Graeco-Roman and Christian traditions.
These have been centered around
the preeminent role of the individual
versus the collective
subject and, derived from the former,
around the meaning and value of
"democracy" (in the sense
defined in the context of that civilization,
namely as a specific form of
representative decision-making).
This is particularly true for the
present period of the so-called
"New World Order" through which
certain Western cultural élites,
in cooperation with the political
establishment of their countries,
have tried to monopolize the global
discourse on democracy and human
rights.[28]
In this context, the paradigm of
the encounter with other civilizations
has been that of Eurocentrism,
which may be seen as the cultural-political
expression of a form of collective
"egotism." The "philosophy of the
ego" (in the sense of a subjectivist,
not necessarily idealistic,
conception) has characterized the
West's overall approach to inter-civilizational
encounters. In the Western tradition,
interaction with other civilizations
was basically driven by the desire
for sharpening one’s own intellectual
and social skills with a view of
broadening the reach and increasing
the strength of one’s own civilization;
raising one’s cultural self-awareness
was related to the aim of dominating
other civilizations or claiming
"global responsibility" for one's
own civilization.[29]
Since the colonial era, the "dialectics
of self-comprehension" (according
to the tradition of European idealism
as exemplified in Hegel’s universal
dialectic of consciousness)[30]
has been interpreted in the sense
of an enrichment of one's
own cultural experience and therefore
improvement of the overall quality
of life through the encounter with
other civilizations. The supremacy
of the interpreter's standpoint
– i.e. of the European terms of
reference – was never challenged
in this Eurocentric perception of
the life-world.[31]
This "subjectivist" approach towards
inter-civilizational encounters
suited the interests of the dominant
culture of the time. It was reflected
in European Orientalism for
example, which combined both Western
naiveté (in the sense of
ignorance of other cultures) and
cultural arrogance.[32]
It is in distinction from this approach
that we have tried to outline the
hermeneutics of civilizational dialogue.
Following from the above analysis
of the dialectical structure of
consciousness (reflection), the
appropriate paradigm for the full
development (or self-realization)
of a civilization is that of
dialogue, not of conflict
("clash"). The latter simply leads
to intellectual isolation and deprives
the respective civilization of its
full potential of development; it
keeps it on a level of philosophical
naiveté. Furthermore, as
aptly stated by A. J. Bacevich,
"the imagery of clashing civilizations
does possess real and potentially
explosive emotional resonance"[33]
– something which has been drastically
demonstrated in the global political
arena, particularly as regards the
armed international conflicts of
recent years.
One must leave the vicious circle
of self-affirmation that has
characterized the Eurocentric approach
towards cultural encounters for
so long. It has not only greatly
discredited the Western tradition
of Enlightenment, but has fuelled
major wars and is now threatening
a kind of permanent conflict
on a global scale. The civilizational
dialogue envisaged here is more
than peaceful co-existence
of distinct social entities; it
also means mutual enrichment
through interdependence (in
the sense of the above-described
dialectic of self-comprehension).
A universal dialogue of civilizations
– one that is not restricted by
political or exclusively shaped
by economic considerations – is
of crucial importance for the future
of mankind. Such a dialogue is a
basic precondition of peace and
stability on both the national and
transnational levels.[34]
For the philosopher, the real "enlightenment"
is not based on a particular (19th
century) tradition of subjectivism,
rationalism and voluntarism (as
was often used to justify the ideology
of political, economic and cultural
colonization during the last two
centuries),[35]
but on an attitude of tolerance
and openness towards other civilizations
that is in itself timeless, i.e.
not related to a particular historical
period. The tópos of the
"clash of civilizations," which
has been used with increasing frequency
since the end of the East-West conflict,
must not become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Enemy stereotypes such
as those created – or reinforced
– in the aftermath of the events
of September 11, 2001, are the direct
result of a rejection of
cultural hermeneutics and a form
of negation of civilizational
self-comprehension.
_______________________________________________________
Bibliography
Mehdi Aminrazavi, Medieval Philosophical Discourse and Muslim-Christian
Dialogue. At
www.islamonline.net/iol-english/qadaya/islamic-1/islamic1.asp
(2004).
Hans Köchler, "Muslim-Christian
Ties in Europe: Past, Present and
Future," in: IKIM Journal,
vol. 7, no. 1 ( January–June 1999),
pp. 97–107.
Notes
[1]
Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of
Muslim Rage," in: The Atlantic
Monthly, vol. 266, no. 3
(September 1990), pp. 47–60.
[2]
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash
of Civilizations?" in: Foreign
Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3
(Summer 1993), pp. 22–49.
[3]
On the ideology of the "New
World Order" see the author's
analysis: Democracy and the
New World Order.
Studies in International Relations,
XIX. Vienna: International Progress
Organization, 1993.
[4]
In a comprehensive volume published
after the 1993 essay, Huntington
had distanced himself from the
view of the inevitability of
a "clash of civilizations":
The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order.
New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996. He made this point even
more clearly in a personal conversation
with the author that was conducted
at the sidelines of the inter-civilizational
dialogue organized by the University
of Malaya in September 1997
in Kuala Lumpur.
[5]
Francis Fukuyama, "The End of
History?" in: The National
Interest, Summer 1989, pp.
3–18. See also: The End of
History and the Last Man.
New York/Toronto: Freepress
and Maxwell Macmillan, 1992.
[6]
On the history of Muslim-Christian
relations see Hans Köchler,
"Muslim-Christian Ties in Europe:
Past, Present and Future," in:
IKIM Journal, vol. 7,
no. 1 ( January–June 1999),
pp. 97–107.
[7]
Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p.
60.
[8]
The author is well aware that
the term "21st century" relates
to the chronology of the Western
(formerly Christian) world.
He uses it here because, for
practical reasons, the chronology
seems to have gained worldwide
cross-cultural acceptance. However,
one might simply replace the
term by the phrase "modern age."
[9]
It should be emphasized, in
this context, that Islamic as
well as Christian philosophy
share the heritage of classical
Greek philosophy (in particular
that of Aristotle), the latter
having influenced European thinking
by way of Muslim philosophers
in Spain. For details see, among
others, Muhammad Asad and Hans
Zbinden (eds.), Islam und
Abendland.
Begegnung zweier Welten.
Olten/Freiburg i.Br.: Walter-Verlag,
1960. On the mutual influence
in Islamic-Christian history
see also Mehdi Aminrazavi,
Medieval Philosophical Discourse
and Muslim-Christian Dialogue.
At
www.islamonline.net/iol-english/qadaya/islamic-1/islamic1.asp
(2004).
However, Aminrazavi is considerably
more skeptical about the possibilities
of present-day dialogue than
the author of this paper.
[10]
Johann Gottlieb
Fichte, Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre.
Ed. by Wilhelm G. Jacobs. Frankfurt a. M.: Deutscher Klassiker
Verlag, 1997. – On the structural
aspects of this relationship
in regard to epistemology and
ontology see Hans Köchler,
Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik
in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie.
Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus
und Realismus.
Meisenheim a.G.: Anton Hain,
1974.
[11]
See his
Versuch über die Erkenntnis.
Leipzig: Meiner-Verlag, 1925.
[12]
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu
einer reinen Phänomenologie
und phänomenologischen Philosophie.
Vol. I. Husserliana, vol. III.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1950.
[13]
On the interrelatedness of the
(human) subject and the "life-world"
see Hans Köchler, "The Problem
of Reality as Seen from the
Viewpoint of Existential Phenomenology,"
in: Analecta Husserliana,
vol. XV.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983,
pp. 175–187.
[14]
Martin Heidegger, Sein und
Zeit. 11th ed.
Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967.
English version: Being and
Time. Trans. by John Macquarrie
& Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell,
1967.
[15]
Hans Köchler (ed.), Cultural
Self-comprehension of Nations.
Tübingen/Basel: Erdmann, 1978.
[16]
For a more detailed analysis
of the implications of this
dialectical approach for international
relations and global peace see
Hans Köchler, Cultural-Philosophical
Aspects of International Cooperation.
Lecture held before the Royal
Scientific Society – Amman-Jordan.
Vienna: International Progress
Organization, 1978.
[17]
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutik
I: Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge
einer philosophischen Hermeneutik.
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul
Siebeck), 5th ed. 1986.
(English version: Truth and Method. Trans. by Garrett
Barden and John Cumming. London:
Sheed and Ward, 1975.)
[18]
The term is used here in the
meaning of Gadamer's hermeneutics:
as "history of subsequent interpretations"
whereby the understanding of
a specific concept is resulting
from the entire history of its
interpretations, i.e. effected
by that very history.
[19]
Martin Heidegger, Sein und
Zeit. – For an interpretation
of Heidegger's existential analysis
in the context of the hermeneutics
of the "life-world" see the
author's Skepsis und Gesellschaftskritik
im Denken Martin Heideggers.
Meisenheim a. G.: Anton Hain,
1978.
[20]
On the phenomenon of globalization
and its philosophical implications
see Hans Köchler, "Philosophical
Aspects of Globalization – Basic
Theses on the Interrelation
of Economics, Politics, Morals
and Metaphysics in a Globalized
World," in: Hans Köchler (ed.),
Globality versus Democracy?
The Changing Nature of International
Relations in the Era of Globalization.
Studies in International Relations,
XXV. Vienna: International Progress
Organization, 2000, pp. 3–18.
[21]
See Immanuel Kant, Kritik
der reinen Vernunft [1781].
Ed. By Georg Mohr and Marcus
Willaschek.
Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1998;
Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische
Meditationen. Ed. Elisabeth
Ströker.
Hamburg: Meiner, 1977. On the
Husserlian notion of the transcendental
subject and the problem of "transcendence"
see Hans Köchler, "The Idealistic
Dimension of the Body-Soul Problem
in Husserl's Phenomenology,"
in: Phenomenological Realism.
Selected Essays. Frankfurt
a.M./Bern/New York: Peter Lang,
1986, pp. 77–89.
[22]
On the nature of the "transcendental
subject" and related questions
of self-awareness see Hans Köchler,
Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik
in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie.
Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus
und Realismus.
Meisenheim a.G.: Anton Hain,
1974.
[23]
See Wilhelm Dilthey, Hermeneutics
and the Study of History.
Ed., with an introduction, by
Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof
Rodi. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1996.
[24]
See his Wahrheit und Methode.
[25]
Ali A. Mazrui, Cultural Forces
of World Politics. London/Nairobi/Portsmouth
(NH): James Currey/Heinemann,
1990, p. 205.
[27]
On the implications of this
position for cross-cultural
dialogue in the present global
constellation see Hans Köchler,
Philosophical Foundations
of Civilizational Dialogue.
The Hermeneutics of Cultural
Self-Comprehension versus the
Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict.
International Seminar on Civilizational
Dialogue (3rd: 15–17 September
1997: Kuala Lumpur), BP171.5
ISCD. Kertas kerja persidangan
/ conference papers. Kuala Lumpur:
University of Malaya Library,
1997.
[28]
For an analysis of this "modern"
hegemonial discourse see the
author's Democracy and the
International Rule of Law. Propositions
for an Alternative World Order.
Vienna/New York: Springer, 1995.
[29]
This self-assertion has become
a typical feature of the "New
World Order" discourse particularly
in the United States.
[30]
See
G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie
des Geistes.
Ed. by Dietmar Köhler and Otto
Pöggeler. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1998. According to Hegel's universal
philosophical conception, the
"dialectic of consciousness"
(Bewußtseinsdialektik)
is interpreted in the sense
of a universal structure of
reality, thereby merging the
traditionally distinct disciplines
of epistemology and ontology.
[31]
This is particularly true in
regard to the Western perception
of Islam. See Edward W. Said,
Covering Islam. How the Media
and the Experts Determine How
We See the Rest of the World.
New York, Vintage Books, 1997.
[32]
See Edward Said, Orientalism.
Western Conceptions of the Orient.
With a New Afterword. London:
Penguin Books, 1995. (First
edition: New York: Pantheon
Books, 1978.) See also more
recently: Fred Dallmayr,
Beyond Orientalism. Essay on
Cross-Cultural Encounter.
Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1996.
[33]
A. J. Bacevich, book review
of Samuel Huntington's "The
Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order," in:
First Things, no. 73 (May
1997), pp. 40–45.
[34]
For an analysis of the potentially
disastrous impact of civilizational
confrontation along the lines
of the doctrine of the "clash
of civilizations" see The
Baku Declaration on Global Dialogue
and Peaceful Co-Existence Among
Nations and the Threats Posed
by International Terrorism,
issued by the International
Progress Organization. Baku,
Azerbaijan, 9 November 2001.
Reprinted in: Hans Köchler,
Global Justice or Global
Revenge? International Criminal
Justice at the Crossroads.
Vienna/New York: Springer, 2003,
pp. 380–386.
[35]
It is to be stated, in this
context, that Immanuel Kant's
critical philosophy – interpreted
by many as basic source of European
Enlightenment – has from the
very outset transcended the
confines of Eurocentrism as
it is understood here. In regard
to international cooperation
and the understanding of the
citizen as cosmopolitan
see his Zum ewigen Frieden.
Ein philosophischer Entwurf.
[Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius,
1795] Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1992.
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