|
Conservative Reform In Contemporary Western Islamic Thought: Tariq Ramadan, A Case Study
By Ludwig
Ammann
Tariq Ramadan is one of the
most controversial Muslim intellectuals
in the Western world. A British
government strategy paper suggested
he could be the leader of an ‘Islamic
Reformation’ in Europe, and after
the July attacks on London he was
appointed to Blair`s Muslim taskforce
attempting to root out Islamic extremism
in Britain. On the other hand, he
was temporarily banned from the
US and France on suspicion of endorsing
terrorism – while an Arab debater
on his website felt it was necessary
to clear him from the suspicion
of “selling out” Islam to the West
by advocating some sort of “Islam
light"… So who is this man whose
mere name sparks heated arguments
at the drop of a hat?
Tariq Ramadan is a grandson of Hasan
al-Bannâ', the founder of the Muslim
Brothers, the youngest son of his
favourite pupil, Said Ramadan, who
ended up in exile in Switzerland
and founded the Islamic Centre in
Geneva. Tariq Ramadan was born there
in 1962, grew up speaking both Arabic
and French and is married to a former
Catholic who converted to Islam.
His political career began in a
circle of Catholic and Protestant
human rights activists. In 1993
he changed to Islamic activism,
following a year of religious studies
in Cairo Cairo.
He holds a master’s degree in Philosophy
and French literature, a PhD in
Arabic and Islamic studies, and
he is currently a visiting professor
at St Anthony’s College of Oxford
University. In the past ten years
Ramadan has become a leading voice
of, above all, French Islam, through
countless lectures, articles and
books. He tries to reach more than
one audience: the Muslim youth of
the suburbs of Paris, Lyon etc.
as well as left-wing intellectuals
and anti-globalisation campaigners
and possibly also a more pious and
conservative constituency in the
Arab world and beyond although his
website is only in English and French
and thus fails to address an Arab
public. It is this extreme balancing
act that gives him an equivocal
quality. A controversy he instigated
with Jewish intellectuals in France
who he accused of ‘communitarianism’,
or bias (in favour of Israel), and
his prime time TV debate with French
Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy
on the headscarf issue have confirmed
him as a media star. The political
scientist Gilles Kepel called Tariq
Ramadan a preacher who is merely
posing as a ‘universalist intellectual’.
This is the jealousy of another
star intellectual writing about
Islam. But it also results from
a widespread view of what kind of
Islam would be acceptable in France:
for Kepel, Caroline Fourest and
many others, only a laicistically
softened, entirely personal Islam
restricted to the private realm
is welcome.
When Tariq Ramadan is judged to be either a ‘reformer’ or a ‘softcore Islamist’
and ‘armchair Jihadist’, this raises
the question of what we actually
want to understand by reform
with regard to Islam. I don’t want
to anticipate your answer; instead,
I would like to report what Tariq
Ramadan understands by reform. In
his last major book, Les musulmans
d’occident et l’avenir de l’islam
(Western Muslims and the Future
of Islam, 2003) he outlines
a typology of the schools of thought
in contemporary Islam (MO 49ff.).
The crucial point is whether the
balance between orientating scriptures
and interpreting reason, i.e. the
Koran and the Sunna on the one hand
and ijtihâd on the other
is kept or lost. So we have two
extremes, the literalist reading
of the text and the primacy of reason
consulting the text only for individual
spiritual and moral inspiration,
and we have the middle way. Examples
given for the literalist extreme
are the traditionalist Tablîghîs
and radical Salafî movements such
as the Hizb at-Tahrîr; this is where
I disagree, revolutionary Islam
is not that literalist. The belief
in reason is equated with liberal
reformism, and that’s supposed to
be a radical secularism à la Kemal
Atatürk, restricting religion to
the private realm of individuals,
cutting it off completely from the
public realm. That is the kind of
Islam many Europeans - as opposed
to Americans – would like best.
The middle way is, in Tariq Ramadan’s
model, a healthy balance between
scripture and reason, and that’s
Salafî reformism of a kind represented
by al-Afghânî, Hasan al Bannâ',
Sharî'atî – and obviously also Tariq
Ramadan himself.
So the basic insight is that the
text must be interpreted through
human reason in order that the believers
remain true to its spirit – that’s
reformism. Only if the text is understood
in its historical context we can
deduce the principles that can then
be applied today. The 'ibâdât
or ritual duties may be timeless,
but when it comes to the mu'âmalât,
or social issues, there is room
to manoeuvre. The basic rule here
is: everything is allowed which
the text does not expressly forbid!
This opens the door for progress,
for a reformist interpretation of
the law that responds to modern
times and circumstances. Just one
telling example: In social issues,
fidelity to the revelation according
to Ramadan is not the slavish
imitation of historically
contingent models, such as the clothing
of the Prophet; that’s something
he criticizes as childish attitude
(IQ 268). He himself, being a Western
Muslim, wears Western clothes and
not some folkloristic costume. In
the West, Ramadan adds, all local
characteristics that are not expressly
forbidden are “not only acceptable,
but by definition Islamic”!
In other words, European culture
should be adopted – selectively,
of course. An earlier book, To
Be a European Muslim (1999)
calls for a creative self-invention
as a European Muslim: One should
neither remain a Turkish or ‘Arab
Muslim in Europe’ nor become
a ‘Muslim without Islam’.
So in the European context, reform
is conceived of as a process of
uncertain outcome, but with high
potential for convergence. ‘Uncertain
outcome’ means that until the inner-Islamic
debate is concluded it is not certain
what will come out of it with regard
to each individual point. That is
an element of resistance against
the widespread desire on the part
of the host society for complete
assimilation. But in contrast to
the anti-Western tendencies of the
champions of Arab, Turkish or Pakistani
ghetto-Islam, it is recommended
that immigrants make a priority
of adapting to the new environment
they themselves have chosen.
So what innovations does Tariq Ramadan’s
reform programme offer? In individual
legal-moral problems he generally
espouses points of view familiar
from the debates of Arab scholars
of a cautiously updating sort. Possibly
his most important contribution
concerns the status of Europe and
the West in Muslim legal thought.
He vehemently rejects the traditional
binary concepts, the opposition
of dâr al-islâm and dâr
al-harb cutting the world into
two halves: Europe, he says, is
of course not the ‘House of War’;
neither is it dâr-al-’ahd,
that is, ‘House of Contract’, because
that does not truly overcome the
medieval scenario of geopolitical
confrontation, and it would mean
that Muslims in Europe could not
feel at home. Instead, he endorses
interpreting the West, in which
Muslims are able to practise their
faith freely, as dâr ash-shahâda,
or ‘House of Testimony’: as a space
in which Muslims bear witness to
their faith - and thus proclaim
the universalist values of Islam,
in other words: they contribute
to reforming Western societies!
Now one of the local characteristics
is secular law, that is, law made
in parliament, taking precedence
over revealed law. This is a tricky
issue. For it is precisely this
concession that representatives
of conservative reform in the Arab
world are not prepared to make.
For them the sharî'a should remain
a - or the - most important legal
authority even in a democracy. Therefore
Tariq Ramadan does not categorically
reduce the sharî'a to a mere source
of moral guidance; instead he makes
a local concession to the
precedence of secular law in the
diaspora. And he demonstrates how
that can work in everyday life:
The law, he says, can be developed
to fit this context because a) the
scripture very rarely sets limits
in the form of express prohibitions
and b) the permissive society actually
leaves it up to the Muslim individual
to simply avoid things forbidden
by the sharî'a, such as the consumption
of alcohol and extra-marital sex.
As Ramadan promises the Muslims
of the West a ‘decisive role
in the development of worldwide
Islam’ (MO 373), solutions
suggested for the diaspora can also
serve as a model for the Islamic
world: they show an alternative
way towards Islamic modernity even
if for the moment other models prevail.
This shows that recasting the sharî'a
as a moral codex or ethics can be
legitimate, albeit initially in
the diaspora, where secularisation
has taken on the form of the complete
separation of the two spheres of
state and religion. The Islamic
world on the other hand, he says,
has learned to differentiate
the two spheres without entirely
separating them. He suggests that
Muslims should allow themselves
to be inspired – undogmatically!
- in their social and political
commitment by the principles of
their scriptures. Muslim majority
societies should therefore each
invent their own individual model
of democracy, appropriate to their
specific historical and cultural
characteristics, based on scripture-inspired
democratic principles such as constitutional
state, equality of citizens, elections
and regular changes of political
leadership; and it must be a model
that can satisfy demanding pluralistic
principles.
So who has the right to interpret
the text for the present day for
the purpose of such democratic inspiration?
Here Ramadan comes straight to the
point, explaining that the world
has become too complex to leave
this up to the specialists in religious
law. He therefore calls for “paritarian
councils uniting 'ulamâs and specialists
in the various fields (human and
natural sciences) in order to enable
legal statements in keeping with
the age in which we live”’.
And he adds that, with regard to
politics, each country should start
a debate that brings together
’ulamâs, intellectuals, and
citizens to decide on how to guarantee
faithfulness to Islamic principles
and ethics (MO, 275). In other words,
the lay intellectual – for from
the point of view of Azhari scholars
Tariq Ramadan is precisely that
despite his year of religious studies!
– challenges the monopoly of religious
scholars on interpretation.
What about the rare cases of grave conflict in his diaspora model? In the
instance of an unjust war the European
Muslim can resort to conscientious
objection. However, he can also
follow his own individual conscience
whenever his interpretation of Islam
differs from interpretations suggested
by the likes of Tariq Ramadan or
Yûsuf al-Qaradâwî – and this, I
think, is another significant innovation
of his thought. He thus grants Muslims
the right not to practise their
faith, if they can reconcile this
with their conscience (PV 92). Similar
rules apply to the controversial
ban on exogamy for women. Ramadan
does explain at length, just as
conservative as the late Pope, why
Muslim women should not marry non-Muslims
(PV 148). However, he also knows
that an impressive quarter of French
women of Algerian descent are doing
precisely that, and so he adds:
the freedom of the individual
must be respected (IQ 282).
The same holds true for the consumption
of alcohol in private (PV 104).
So much for the cornerstones of
this reform philosophy. Tariq Ramadan
has made clear that he is not a
liberal reformer. However, he is
also not the reactionary Islamist
that left-wing voices claim he is.
He is simply a conservative. If
the pro-abortion and pro-PAC activist
Caroline Fourest has only just discovered
that he does not share her political
point of view (Frère Tariq,
2004), that is not his fault: he
had already clearly stated his position
on every single controversial point
she raises in her ostensibly revelatory
book in a 1999 conversation with
Jacques Neirynck (PV). What is exposed
is therefore not his ‘duplicity’,
but her ignorance - the ignorance
of paternalistic left-wingers. Immigrants
may be a welcome clientele for left-wing
parties, but as Muslims from traditional
rural backgrounds they have not
that much in common with them as
far as basic values, for example
family values, are concerned. This
discrepancy is currently manifesting
itself and can be expected to lead
to new political alliances.
Anti-Ramadan campaigns like the
one led by Caroline Fourest shouldn’t
mislead us. She hasn’t any scruples
to use misrepresentation and insinuation
to exclude her political opponent
from public discourse. If liberal
reformers justify the right to apostasy
by referring to the Koranic verse
about ‘no compulsion in religion’,
they are welcome. Not so a conservative
reformer like Ramadan - although
he demands this right by referring
to freedom of conscience, and then
explains, according to the traditional
rules of law interpretation, that
the majority of legal scholars demand
the death penalty by referring to
a hadith of the Prophet,
but that this hadith is questionable
and that therefore since the 8th
century a minority wanted to leave
the judgement to God – and he
endorses
this opinion because it
respects the freedom of conscience
(IQ 276ff.)! Fourest doesn't tell
us these details. Instead she claims
without page references that Ramadan's
acceptance of apostacy is ‘mere
lip service’ (FT 159ff.). Nay, it
is something completely different,
namely the only way of reaching
the majority of Muslims where they
currently stand! Anyone who argues
as liberals do will not get attention
from the Arab masses.
The Lutheran stance
Unlike Fourest in the arrogance
of her power, Tariq Ramadan knows
what he is doing. His ‘Mind the
gap!’ discourse strategy builds
a credible bridge from the narrow-minded,
defensive way of thinking of the
conservative majority to our present
day; credible not least because
as a descendent of the founder of
the Muslim Brothers, he is a charismatic
embodiment of the overdue succession
of a new generation. He formulates
possibilities of connecting with
contemporary discourse for a clientele
in need of an authority. And he
unofficially introduces the authority
of the conscience, which establishes
the individual’s freedom to dissent,
the Lutheran ‘Here I stand – I cannot
do otherwise!’ as the original scene
of every reform. "What creates freedom
is the true existence of the principles
on which it is founded: an autonomous
conscience choosing in the name
of its convictions" (MO 243 on Islamic
feminism). Ramadan would like to
make Islamic thought more dynamic,
but he insists on an ‘endogenous
development in the rhythms of internal
progress in the thought and mentality’
of the Islamic civilisations (IQ
181f.). So in the inner-Islamic
culture wars about the two speeds
of reform he sides with the people
overtaken by change. That makes
him a conservative reformer, but
not a reactionary. He himself describes
it as follows: ‘Que faire pour
faire évoluer les mentalités? Condamner
les sources scriptuaires et ne plus
être entendu par le monde musulman?
Imposer une opinion dite moderne
en étant dans les faits perçu comme
un “occidentalisé” ou, pire, un
agent dévoyé à la cause de “l’ennemi”?
Être entendu de l'Occident ayant
perdu l'écoute du monde islamique?
Se faire plaisir dans sa modernité
assumée en n'ayant plus aucun rôle
à jouer dans un univers sombrant
dans la répression et la légitimation
religieuse la plus hypocrite?’
(PV (2004), 22.)
[‘What should be done to make mentalities
evolve? Condemn the scriptural sources
and no longer be listened to by
the Muslim world? Impose an opinion
described as modern, while being
perceived by one’s actions as “occidentalised”
or, worse, as an agent devoted to
the cause of “the enemy”? To be
listened to by the West, having
lost the ear of the Islamic world?
To delight in one’s assumed modernity
while having no further role to
play in a universe slumbering in
repression and the most hypocritical
of religious legitimisation?’]
Fourest,
Caroline (2004): Frère Tariq. Discours,
stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan.
Paris (= FT).
Ghadban, Ralph (2006):
Der Euro-Islam von Tariq Ramadan.
Berlin (forthcoming).
Gresh, Alain / Ramadan,
Tariq (2002): L’islam en questions.
Débat animé et présenté par Françoise
Germain-Robin.
2., veränderte Auflage.
Arles (= IQ).
Kamali, Muhammad
Hashim (2002): Freedom, Equality
and Justice in Islam. Cambridge.
Krämer, Gudrun (1999):
Gottes Staat als Republik: Reflexionen
zeitgenössischer Muslime zu Islam,
Menschenrechten und Demokratie.
Baden-Baden (= GR).
Krawietz, Birgit
(2002): Hierarchie der Rechtsquellen
im sunnitischen Islam.
Berlin (= HR).
Ramadan, Tariq (2003):
Les musulmans d’occident et l’avenir
de l’islam. Paris (= MO).
Ramadan, Tariq (2004):
Peut-on vivre avec l’islam? Entretien
avec Jacques Neirynck.
2., veränderte Auflage.
Lausanne (= PV; 1. Auflage 1999).
Ramadan, Tariq (2001):
Muslimsein in Europa.
Köln (= ME; engl.
Original 1999).
Ramadan, Tariq (2005):
Appel international à un moratoire
sur les châtiments corporels, la
lapidation et la peine de mort dans
le monde musulman.
30. März 2005 auf
www.tariqramadan.com, 4. April 2005
in Le Monde, Übersetzungen ins Englische,
Arabische, Spanische, Holländische
und Deutsche auf der Webseite; dort
auch Auseinandersetzung mit Einwänden
der Azhar-Rechtsforschungs-Kommission,
der Stellungnahme des Mufti von
Ägypten und einfachen Gläubigen.
Ramadan, Tariq (2005): [Manifest
gegen den Terror in der liberalen
panarabischen Zeitung Asch-Scharq
al-Ausat vom 21. Juli 2005], gekürzte
Übersetzung auf
www.memri.de/uebersetzungen_analysen/themen/europa_und_der_nahe_osten/eu_londonattack_ramadan_04_08_05.html]
(= MT).
Zemouri, Aziz (2005): Faut-il faire
taire Tariq Ramadan? Suivi d’un
entretien avec Tariq Ramadan.
Paris.
www.tariqramadan.com
|
