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Behind the Cartoons
By Mohammed A. Bamyeh
First, learning: An
international crisis of the kind
unleashed due to the insulting
cartoons of the prophet always
invites us to think more clearly
and to learn the right lessons.
For it carries within it the
seeds of great errors: the error
of confusing one event or
anomaly with a pattern in the
culture or history, of confusing
a pure accident with the essence
or whole logic of an enduring
struggle. In our focus on the
violence accompanying it, we
forget that by and large the
vast majority of protests and
protestors have in fact been
peaceful. In our focus on the
most highly visible spectacles
and vitriolic speeches and
threats, we forget that for
several months, until it arrived
at newsrooms, the modus
operandi of opposition
movement to the publication of
the cartoons had been
characterized by patient,
deliberative, clear-headed
organizing.
Second, inevitability: there is
nothing that should lead us to
expect that a crisis of this
kind was inevitable. Had we been
living in different, more sane,
less enervating times, with a
smaller sense of threat, fewer
sources of aggravation and more
effective venues through which
to express grievances, there
would have been much less of a
reason for an insult to Muhammad
in a far away place to cause an
international crisis. Had the
Danish prime minister had the
good sense to at least meet with
the local Muslim leaders at the
beginning, as they had asked,
the issue may have ended then
and there. Those leaders went
overseas with their cause only
because they found no receptive
ear in Denmark itself, and thus
wanted to receive international
pressure to resolve what was for
them a local problem. Further,
the fire of the crisis would not
have found so much additional
kindling to feed its insatiable
appetite, had we not have this
global consciousness prefigured
by awareness of profound,
unresolved injustices: an open
wound in Palestine, an
occupation that has, among other
factors, destroyed a once
prosperous and proud Iraqi
society, and unaccountable
governments everywhere in the
Muslim world.
We could also ask questions on
not simple what happened, but
what did not. Why, for
example, did we not see even
more violence? Many
Europeans have used this crisis
to question, once again, whether
Muslim immigrants really fit in
Europe, completely ignoring the
fact that in Europe itself the
protests of the community, to
the extent they happened, were
in fact peaceful and
constructive. Is there a problem
with Muslims in Europe, or is
there a bigger problem, perhaps,
in European policies of
integration and European
multicultural politics
generally?
With some exceptions, notably
Britain, Europe has generally
not yet adjusted fully to the
fact that it has become in
effect a constellation of
multicultural societies. The
French model provided elements
of the basic approach elsewhere
in the continent: “Islam must
adjust itself to the Republic,
not the Republic to Islam.” This
prototypical formula posited a
non-existent problem as a
problem, for no one was really
asking any European
society to adjust to Islam. The
problem was that immigrants as a
category were treated as a
source of perpetual social
trouble rather than as equal
citizens, and that Islam was
treated as an alien whole,
rather than as a highly varied
practice.
This suspicion of Islam and
Muslims meant that it was up to
Muslims in Europe to prove
that they have become
“European,” and this demand took
sometimes an extreme form of
provocation, of which these
cartoons are but the latest
example. A forerunner to the
cartoons crisis was the case of
the Dutch provocateur director
Theo van Gogh, who did not shy
from publicly using profanities
to describe Muslims, and who in
one film screened passages of
the Qur’an against the bodies of
naked women. The murder of van
Gogh by a Dutch Muslim from a
Moroccan descent in November of
2004 touched off a grave crisis
in the Netherlands and Europe,
and many politicians and public
commentators used it as an
occasion to argue that Muslims
in Europe were introducing
intolerance into otherwise
tolerant, liberal democracy.
Little mention was made of the
fact that van Gogh was murdered
by one man, not by a whole
“community,” or of the principle
that criminality should be
punished as it happens and
accordingly to law, equally,
rather than become interpreted
in terms of supposedly essential
attributes of other peoples’
cultures. Before these cartoons,
the Danish press had for years
been demonizing the Muslim
community. It was filled with
lurid tales of a culture based
on forced marriage, honor
killings, domestic abuse,
homophobia and the subjugation
of women. Criminal acts by any
Muslim immigrant quickly became
interpreted in terms of culture.
For example, when an immigrant
killed his daughter, the press
immediately explained the matter
as an honor killing, and thus as
a cultural symptom, rather than
as an act of criminality like
all others—in this case, it
eventually turned out that the
man in question was mentally
unstable. He was certainly not
expressing "his culture" in
killing his daughter, but the
matter was made to appear so in
the Danish press.
In both cases the intention was
not simply practice “free
speech”—one, after all, always
makes choices as to what
one speaks about, even in
conditions of absolute freedom.
(We now know, for example, that
three years before the same
Danish newspaper rejected
cartoons depicting Jesus
negatively, precisely on the
ground that they could cause an
outcry).In the cases of van
Gogh’s film and Rose’s cartoons,
the intention was to
provoke through offence.
However, clearly van Gogh did
not expect to be murdered for
his provocations, in the same
way that Flemming Rose, the
editor of the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten, did not
expect such an uncontrollable
international furor to result
from his decision to solicit and
publish the Muhammad cartoons.
Thus in both case the offenders
succeeded far more than they had
anticipated. The social climate
in Europe after both cases was
characterized by a sense of
great “surprise” at the
intensity of the reaction. This
surprise furnished not simply
anti-Muslim vitriol, but also
something more positive: an
incentive for serious
communication and education
about Islam and Muslims. It is
reported that bookstores in
Denmark have run out of copies
of the Qur’an—just as bookstores
in the US were raided for copies
of the same book after September
11. Yet one can read the entire
Qur’an and learn nothing about
the background of what happened
after the cartoons globally.
More relevant would be to read
about the material conditions
and political grievances in
Muslim societies today. Those
conditions and grievances, which
often have little to do with
Islam itself as a religion, are
what produce a volatile
environment in which isolated
incidents and otherwise
forgettable insults may lead to
uncontrollable crises.
We do live now in a truly
interconnected global society.
The fact that an issue of this
nature has generated such a
global agitation verifies the
fact. It testifies, among other
things, to the power of the
Internet as a tool of
organizing, but also to the
possibilities of global
grass-roots movement concerned
with common issues. Here we have
a good example of a global
society working out its common
issues through its own
initiatives.
It should naturally be expected
that in such a movement there
will be a certain uncontrollable
element. Not only is there no
central leadership for such a
global movement, it is also in
its nature to cause various
local grievances to add to the
energy of the movement precisely
as all grievances converge upon
a common cause. Distress about
the oppression of the
Palestinians, the destruction of
Iraq, or imperialist threats and
arrogance generally, become
added on to the protest, since
these older and festering
malignancies place the cartoons
into a larger, supposedly
connected narrative of grand
clash on a world scale.
Similarly, discontent with
unaccountable, unresponsive,
illegitimate or ineffective
governance locally becomes added
to the sum total of grievances.
The cartoons then summarize,
stand in, or become a symbol for
all the weaknesses and
vulnerabilities of the umma.
The issue thus is not simply
that offensive cartoons appeared
in a far away newspaper that few
had ever heard of. They are
offensive and are intended to
provoke, but there is more. It
is that "more"--our own other
grievances, weaknesses and
vulnerabilities--that we need to
address and resolve. We do have
problems to worry about other
than the cartoons, even though
these have given everyone, in
Europe as well as in the Muslims
World, an opportunity to think
not only about how to better
communicate, but also how to
begin to address real issues,
rather than remain fixated on
symbols of real issues. |