
The Recovery of Transcendence in Political Order: The Role of Multi-religious Cooperation
By Dr. William F. Vendley
Introduction
I want to acknowledge the
presence of our distinguished
friends in the French Chapter of
the World Conference of
Religions for Peace.[1]
Monsieur Nicolas Sarkozy has caused a little tempest here in France
by challenging laïcité, acknowledging the importance of religion in
France, and supporting a “laïcité positive” that contemplates public
funding for religions. Whatever we may think regarding this particular proposal,
or perhaps about similar ones being advanced by political parties in the United
States, there arises a fundamental question as to whether or not there can be
space for God in the public order. That profound question goes to the heart of
the remarks that I would like to share with you today. My remarks are focused
upon secular political orders, those heirs of the political revolutions that
took place some 200 years ago, notably in France.
Sarkozy is controversial in his
engagement with religion as a
politician, but he is hardly
alone. In the United States,
President Bush frequently
employs religious imagery and
acknowledges the influence of
his personal faith on his
political outlook. Indeed, today
in France, in the United States,
and in other secular
democracies, religion at times
appears like a political
football advanced by one party
and rejected by another. Here in
Europe, the debate over whether
to mention God in the European
Constitution re-exposed old
fault lines, but it seems that
this debate, at least in the
press, explored the issues only
superficially. Has the debate
examined the issues at the level
of political order? It seems
the answer is no. And in
general, when it comes to
politicians it often seems that
those who have “favorable”
positions in relationship to
religion may be using or even
distorting religion, while those
who refuse to engage the
question of religion’s relevance
in public life may be trying to
pass over what simply will not
be ignored.
It is fitting to raise this
topic here in Paris, at the seat
of UNESCO, the institution
charged with marshalling what
might be called our
“civilizational wealth” for the
building of peace. UNESCO works
among diverse political
communities. Some of these
communities were inspired by
great traditions of
transcendence. Others
explicitly rejected notions of
transcendence. So, how can
UNESCO work to advance peace in
this situation?
The French philosopher, Jacques
Maritain, gave an admirable and
still relevant account of the
challenge in his inaugural
address to the second
international conference of
UNESCO in 1947. He noted the
deep divisions in the human
community and that it had become
increasingly difficult to even
bring to consciousness the
implicit philosophies to which
each of us, willy-nilly, are
committed in actual fact.
However deep we may dig, there
is no longer any common
foundation for speculative
thought. There is no common
language for it.
Maritain’s answer as to how
UNESCO can work is instructive.
He notes that UNESCO's goal is a
practical one; agreement among
its members can be achieved, not
on common speculative notions,
but on common practical notions;
not in the affirmation of the
same conception of the world,
humanity and knowledge, but on
the affirmation of a similar set
of convictions concerning
action. Maritain goes on to
note that this is doubtless very
little. It is in his words “the
last refuge of intellectual
agreement among men.”[2]
Yet, he argues with courage that
it is enough to try to undertake
a “great work.”
Maritain’s argument, if closely
attended, can also serve as an
intellectual rationale for
today’s multi-religious
cooperation. Each religion can
be understood as having its own
distinct and quite different
grounding and
self-interpretation. But can
they cooperate? How can
different religions advance this
common work, based upon this
“last refuge of intellectual
agreement among men?” Can our
religious communities find
deeply held and widely shared
concerns to which they can
commit with the full strength of
their philosophical and
religious convictions?
In my experience, cooperation
among the world’s religious
communities is going forth on
the basis of practical
commitment and it has enormous
potential to achieve Maritain’s
“great work.”
Perhaps no form of cooperation
has greater potential to improve
conditions for more people
worldwide than the cooperation
of the world’s religious
communities. Consider the
following realities: Of the
world’s six billion people, five
billion identify themselves as
members of religious
communities. Of the 25 million
who live in zones of conflict,
23 million could be accessed
through their religious
communities. Of the 40 million
who have HIV/AIDs, up to 35
million could be reached through
their religious communities. Of
the 3 billion who live on less
than two dollars a day, some 2.8
billion could be reached through
their religious communities.
Religious communities are
already present on the front
lines of today’s major
challenges. Their potential to
meet the challenges of our time
is a vast, still relatively
untapped resource, and I believe
that cooperation is a key to
unleashing this potential.
Religions for Peace
builds, equips and networks
Inter-Religious Councils and
groups that harness the largely
untapped power of religious
communities to establish peace,
transform conflict and advance
sustainable development.
Examples of multi-religious
cooperation achieving tangible
results on the ground abound
within the Religions for
Peace international
network. Religious communities
are working together to mediate
wars, educate for peace and
address HIV/AIDS. This is
important and necessary work.
But the question I wish to pose
today goes deeper.
By framing the work of
Religions for Peace in a way
analogous to the work of UNESCO,
our multi-religious work can
appropriately be understood in
profoundly practical terms. The
related practical ends are
relatively non-controversial.
They deal with transforming
conflicts, promoting peace, and
advancing sustainable
development. The entire project
of multi-religious cooperation
is thus framed in terms
accessible to all, whether
religious or nonreligious. It is
framed in terms of deeply held
and widely shared concerns
regarding major problems cutting
across our respective
communities.
Surely this practical work will
always be necessary in our world
and existentially important for
committed religious believers,
but is it enough? So framed,
multi-religious cooperation does
not raise the question of God,
and does not even try to relate
it to questions of political
order. But could it? Could
multi-religious cooperation help
to make space for God in the
public order? More specifically,
and perhaps a bit more
carefully, could
multi-religious cooperation be
the very way in which an opening
to transcendence can re-enter
the public square?
The Exclusion of
Transcendence as the Cause of
Secular Dis-order
Allow me to restrict my remarks to the modern Western tradition.
I would basically like to maintain that the exclusion of transcendence from
political order is the fundamental source of secular dis-order. This may sound
like a profoundly ungrateful, if not deeply cranky position. Has not the modern
secular period been attended by a growth in democratic institutions, personal
freedoms and tolerance among different groups?
Surely, there have been tremendous gains made by the traditions we recognize as
“modern.” I live by these gains, am grateful for them and want to acknowledge
them as forms of progress.
But, to help me make my point, I ask you to offer me another allowance: grant
the existence of religious believers’ convictions regarding the reality of the
experience of transcendence. This is not the time and place to try to provide
an intellectual defense of these convictions, although I believe that one can be
offered.
If you grant this allowance, it will not be hard to show that the modern Western
trajectory is a history of the successive exclusion of transcendence from
political order. From a religious perspective, this exclusion of transcendence
is anything but a minor “disorder.” Rather, it can be argued that this
exclusion is the fundamental root “disorder” of modern Western political life.
The claim for disorder occasioned by the exclusion of transcendence is not
addressed either to the political right or left: an examination of the last
century shows that both right and left forms of secular governance, political
forms that formally excluded transcendence, have deaths to account for within
the range of 100 million. Eric Voegelin, the European political philosopher
whose thought has helped me in shaping my remarks, speaks of the last century as
“modernity without restraint,” as if its ghastly record exposes in the last
century what was being unleashed at its origins.[3]
Such a record should make us ponder carefully when today we hear, all too
frequently, that religion is the major source of conflict. Surely in the last
century, it was secular political ideologies, not religions in the ordinary
sense, that clashed with such extreme vehemence.
What, then, do we mean by transcendence? The fundamental experience of
transcendence is the consciousness of an existential tension towards the Divine
ground. From a religious point of view, turning into, even embracing, this
existential tension toward the Divine ground has been understood as a
“conversion,” a “tuning” of the soul to the good. Within the soul open to its
Divine ground there is disclosed the “order” of the soul. The soul is poised
between earth and its mysterious, uncreated Source that it cannot master or
control. In the experience of transcendence, the soul cannot have itself by
itself. It must turn toward the Divine ground to which it is existentially
oriented. And, only in this turning toward the Divine ground does the soul both
find itself with and for the other.
In the classical view, differentiated by Plato and Aristotle but adapted by
Jewish, Christian and Islamic theologies, human understandings of truth require
the participation of the Divine in the process of knowing. The participation of
the Divine might be understood as mediated by the Platonic Agathon, the
Aristotelian Nous, or the Thomistic ratio aeterna. These words do
not refer to a tangible object in the external world, and thus cannot refer to
reality according to modern notions of science. To modern science, these words
must be a fiction. However, for religious people these terms, or variants of
them, point to a reality that is experienced. Further, religious people know
that the experience of something like the Nous, by which the Divine
participates in our knowing, depends on openness for transcendent experience.
Existential closure and estrangement from transcendence limit our abilities to
acknowledge it.
Turning into the Divine ground that opens out beyond the soul attunes the soul
to its own transcendental order. By the same token, turning away from the
Divine ground becomes the fundamental experience of disorder. Plato extends
this radical insight by working out the parallelism between the order of the
soul and the order of city. This parallel notion is both kept and transformed
by Augustine, refined by Aquinas and was still present in France in a
half-modern form in the brilliant 16th century work of Jean Bodin.
But today, it no longer holds in the public square.
But what shall be the basis of political order, if not the fundamental order
disclosed by the soul’s existential orientation to its Divine ground?
Thomas Hobbes is particularly clear among the modern thinkers who eliminate the
transcendent basis of social and political life in their theoretical analysis.
His thinking is instructive of the kind of fundamental dis-order that arises
from the elimination of transcendence from political order. When Hobbes
attempts to remove transcendence from political order, it requires that
something else must replace the transcendental ground as the orienting force for
existential and social order. Transcendence orients both the soul and society
to the Divine ground, the summum bonum, as the basis of order. With the
removal of the summum bonum by the elimination of transcendence, there
also disappears the source of order for both the soul and for society. For, the
order of the soul and the community depends on the common nous, which
provides a shared experience of the summum bonum. With the elimination
of the nous, Hobbes is faced with the problem of constructing an order of
society from isolated individuals not oriented toward a common purpose, but only
motivated by their individual passions. For Hobbes, the common passion that
orders political and social life is fear. The summum bonum is replaced
by the summum malum as the order of society and politics. This shift in
the foundation of political order is not a small change, hardly a mere
re-arranging of the furniture in our common room.
The great value of Hobbes is his clarity. With him it becomes quite clear that
if transcendence is not to be the basis of the order of the soul and of society,
something else must be.
But from the religious perspective, transcendence is real. Removing the
transcendental source of order from political science does not change the
ontological structure of reality. From the religious perspective, substituting
the summum bonum for the summum malum as the basis of order is
tantamount to a profound dis-order. The transcendent ground of the soul is
rendered merely immanent, or “this worldly.” But this is not stable. On the
one hand, the claim that there is any truth at all beyond ideology is easily
surrendered. Everything is relative, everything is situational. What is
truth? Today, the question is usually met with an existential and intellectual
skepticism which feigns tolerance to all views, but perhaps reveals a
narcissistic closure to deeper questions of our spirit. On the other hand,
perhaps in reaction to a spirit-deadening relativity, the merely worldly -- be
it notions of race, ethnicity, economic ideology or even a religion
misinterpreted and cut off from its own moorings in transcendence -- are all too
easily made “absolute.” Then, the path to political religions can be both
short and deadly, as the last century shows too well. And even short of war, we
are right to worry over totalizing dimensions of modern order – be they
political or economic – that kill the soul, if not the body.
During the Cold War, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, speaking at Harvard University,
critiqued both Socialism and Western materialism, pointed to the flaws in modern
humanism and diagnosed the need for a “major watershed in history, equal in
importance to the turn from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance.” “It will demand
from us,” Solzhenitsyn argued, “a spiritual blaze; we shall have to rise to a
new height of vision, to a new level of life, where our physical nature will not
be cursed, as in the Middle Ages, but even more importantly, our spiritual being
will not be trampled upon, as in the Modern Era.”[4]
Multi-religious Cooperation and the Recovery of Transcendence
Solzhenitsyn’s call for a “spiritual
blaze” is suggestive and awaited amid still burning coals and small flickering
flames. But his suggestive term underlines our thesis. First and foremost, the
overcoming of political dis-order depends upon the recovery of the soul’s
experience of its own order disclosed in transcendence. Surely, this can be no
simple return to the efforts and categories of the past. Carefully
contemplating these previous attempts can no doubt be helpful; they can
profoundly stimulate and inform our analogical imaginations. Yet, in the final
analysis our work in our time must be based upon our own cultivations of
transcendence. We must work to return again and again to the consciousness of
the grounding reality that lies out beyond our selves. In short, the recovery
of transcendence in political order depends in a most fundamental way on the
recovery of transcendence by people.
A similar point has been made by Vaclav Havel who now openly points to the need
for transcendence in political order. President Havel notes that “in today’s
multi-cultural world, the truly reliable path to co-existence, to peaceful
co-existence and creative cooperation, must start from what is at the root of
all cultures and what lies infinitely deeper in human hearts and minds than
political opinion, convictions, antipathies, or sympathies – it must be rooted
in self-transcendence.”[5]
Living a life of transcendence always demands courage. Trying to live
transcendence in a dis-ordered society, one that has lost the language of
transcendence can demand even more. Before the accomplished, the captains, the
hard-headed realists of secular orders, it can even feel embarrassing. It seems
so out of date, so irritatingly passé, so naive, so foolish to speak of
transcendence to those who have mastered the rules of an order that has excluded
it.
And yet, it would seem unmistakably clear that the cultivation of genuine,
contemporary spiritualities of transcendence must form the base and provide the
foundation for a renewal of political order. Cultivating powerful and sustained
experiences of transcendence in today’s world is, without doubt, the most
elemental contribution that our religious communities can make. Further,
building on these experiences of transcendence, religious communities are
challenged to tackle the shape of political order. They are challenged to
mediate their own understandings of the transcendental order of the person into
forms of political order that are open to and respectful of transcendence.
But how can this be done today while respecting a genuine plurality of views?
That is our fundamental challenge. And it is proper to ask what role
multi-religious cooperation can play in allowing for a re-entrance of
transcendence into political order.
The question is quite large and my contribution is necessarily limited and
formal, really just a hint pointing a way forward.
Recall with me the words of Jacques Maritain. He noted in the words I cited in
my beginning that “however deep we dig, there is no longer any common foundation
for speculative thought. There is no common language for it.”
Let’s ponder his last sentence: “there is no common language for it.” I have
great sympathy for Maritain’s reserve, but I also wonder if we may be seeing a
development that can give us some hope.
Languages are open systems: they are creative; they develop. And something is
developing with the language religious communities are using as they work
together to commitment themselves to take practical action on the basis of what
Maritain calls “the last refuge of intellectual agreement among men.”
Many religious communities have opened the door to effective religious
cooperation by in effect becoming bilingual.[6]
Every faith tradition has its own primary language that defines the religious
community. Traditions make clear that this primary religious language develops.
It is open, dynamic and genetic. It provides the grammar of identity for
religious communities as they make their way through time, orienting them to
their past, presents and futures.
But primary religious language, despite its elemental power, is not a language
for engaging other religious communities or the public. Representatives of
religious communities are now also learning to speak in public language.
Religious communities are learning how to transpose their moral concerns,
anchored in their respective primary languages, into a shared public language.
This shared public language provides a medium to clarify agreements and
differences on important moral issues, and serves as a basis for cooperative
action, the kind of practical action of which Maritain speaks.
But is this all that is possible? Can only practical concerns be mediated into
public language? If religious communities can transpose their practical moral
concerns into public languages, what about their other concerns? What should
stop religious communities from also mediating their experiences of
transcendence, the order of the soul, and the exigencies for political order
into public language?
We could cite suggestive examples: HRH Prince Hassan, the Moderator of
Religions for Peace, wrote the late Pope John Paul II to share his
admiration, as a committed Muslim, for the social teachings of the Catholic
Church. Prince Hassan recognized that, in addition to their religious grounds,
the body of social teachings could be largely argued for on the basis of public
forms of rationality open to transcendence. In his letter, Prince Hassan shared
his own understandings of core Islamic experiences of spirituality that could
also be mediated in public ways as resources for the development of forms of
political order open to both pluralism and transcendence.
We might argue that today our public language is precisely ill-equipped to
express such exalted topics. We might point out that today our public language
is formally reductive and does not allow such topics to be expressed. But while
this is largely true, is that an adequate response? Why should we presume that
public language is finished, closed, and not open to development? It strikes me
that the development of public language, or languages of transcendence, as well
as public notions of political order open to transcendence, is one of the great
challenges to our religions.
Let me conclude with an image that has often helped me. Before I moved to an
apartment in New York City, I had a home in the country with a rather large
study. On the wall behind my desk, I fixed a chart some three meters across and
over a meter high. On the vertical axis of the chart were listed the known
civilizations of our human family, while the histories of their rising, falling,
dying or developing were marked out across the three meter width. The chart
provided me with a wonderful image of our human family. What struck me, as I
pondered it, was the brevity of what we call the modern experience. It made up
about the last 2 centimeters of the three meter chart.
These last 2 centimeters contain the period of political order that excludes
transcendence. And yet virtually everything that leads to these 2 centimeters
were periods of political order informed by differing notions of transcendence,
however compact or however differentiated they might have been.
Does not this image of the chart suggest a great labor for our religious
communities? A labor that would engage our analogical imaginations as we both
recall our pasts and work to summon the creativity required to express
transcendence going forward. Are we to suppress our histories and disallow the
profound experiences of transcendence that have brought us into the modern
period? Or, can we, instructed by them as living traditions of transcendence,
labor in our own time to transpose our own historically shaped but contemporary
religious experiences of transcendence into public language relevant to building
political order open to transcendence?
Formulating public languages of transcendence will be no guarantee of progress.
Such language will have to compete with other forms of public discourse that
refuse transcendence. And yet, transcendent public language can express and
also guide those who taste the thrall of the soul’s existential pull to its
Divine ground.
In short, I believe we in Religions for Peace have two tasks: The first
shall always be with us. It is the practical task, one freighted with enormous
existential meaning, of working together to transform conflicts, build peace and
advance sustainable development. These practical tasks express well the
concerns of religious people.
But there is a second task, one to be carried out concurrent with the first. It
is our concern for order: for political, social and economic orders that are
open to and in their own ways honor the full mystery and dignity of each person
disclosed in the soul’s orientation to its Divine ground.
While we carry together the buckets of water to put out today’s fires, let us
also carry the bricks we need in order to build together. Let us cultivate our
own most radical and inclusive experiences of transcendence and related notions
of order, but then, let us learn how to speak of them in our churches,
synagogues and mosques, and also in our public squares in ways that embrace
differences.
Perhaps Solzhenitsyn’s great “spiritual blaze” shall yet come. In the meantime,
we have our work to do.
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[1] Founded in 1970 as an international, non-sectarian organization, the World Conference of Religions for Peace is now the largest coalition of the world’s religious communities. The International Governing Board of Religions for Peace includes Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Indigenous leaders.
[2] Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason (1952), pp. 180-81.
[3] In addition to Voegelin’s many works, helpful for my speech has been Michael P. Federici, Eric Voegelin (Wilimington, Delaware: 2002)
[4] Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, Commencement Address Delivered at Harvard University, June 8, 1978.
[5] Vaclav Havel, The Need for Transcendence in the Postmodern World, A speech made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, July 4, 1994.
[6] For a more extended discussion of religious bi-lingualism see William F. Vendley, “Religious Difference and Shared Care: The Need for Primary and Secondary Language,” Church and Society (September/October 1992), 16-29.