Islamic
Responses to Terrorism
Sayyed Nadeem Kazmi
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism provokes deep fear and insecurity - more than other
forms of violence. Terrorists strike innocent civilians, often randomly, and
without warning. Terrorists know this, and they seek to use intimidation to
impose their political or other agendas. Terrorism is also used as low-cost
strategic warfare. Terrorism also has a high economic cost. Technology has also
added to the terrorist threat. Finally, terrorism today is far more devastating
than in the past because of the mass media. No story plays better, or longer,
than a terrorist attack.
(Ambassador Philip Wilcox, Jr., State Department Coordinator
for Counter-terrorism, in Patterns of Global Terrorism, Report of the Office
of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, United States, April 2001)
On 10th October, 2001, an emergency conference of Islamic states’ (OIC) foreign
ministers, meeting in Doha, Qatar, issued an official statement strongly condemning
the “savage acts of terrorism which targeted the United States” a month earlier
(1). The text emphasized that such acts contravened the teachings of divine
religions and moral and human values, and stressed that such acts could not,
and should not, be linked with Islam. It also stressed the need to track down
the perpetrators, and to punish them. Based on the provisions of an existing
OIC treaty to combat international terrorism, the conference said that member
states were prepared to actively engage in a collective international effort
to define terrorism “under the canopy of the United Nations”, emphasizing dealing
with its root causes, and towards achieving world security and stability. The
conference also rejected any link between terrorism and the right of Muslim
and Arab peoples, “including the Palestinian and Lebanese people”, to self-determination,
self-defence, sovereignty, and resistance against occupation and aggression.
These were, according to the text, legitimate rights guaranteed both by the
Charter of the United Nations and International Law. This is an important statement
in many respects, not least because it pledges Muslim and Arab countries to
the so-called war against terrorism and at the same time contains caveats which,
a year on from the attacks of 11th September, 2001, are becoming increasingly
relevant to our understanding of the world, past, present and future. That Muslims
were vociferous in their condemnation of the terrorist atrocities of 11th September
specifically (and terrorism more generally) is perhaps succinctly encapsulated
in the words of Sayyed Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, son of the late Shi’a Muslim spiritual
leader, Grand Ayatullah Sayyed Abu al-Qasim al-Musawi al-Khoei, who emphatically
declared in a published statement (2), “Terrorist acts violate Islamic law”.
In describing what was done as “impermissible under any pretext”, al-Khoei went
on that the events of 11th September, “regardless of one’s views and regardless
of who the perpetrators were” (that is, regardless of their religion also),
was in itself a “criminal and barbaric action totally remote from moral values
and religious and human principles”. Like many Muslim representatives and scholars,
he was unequivocal in describing the atrocity as an act that was as much against
Islam and Muslims as against anything else. Al-Khoei stated that, “Attributing
this crime to religion and [to] devout people is much more dangerous and harmful
than what the external enemies are inflicting on us”, and went on to describe
it as an Islamic duty “not to lose our moral existence and forfeit the liberality
of Islam’s message” by opposing such extremism: “While we reject aggression
against Muslims and their countries and what is imposed on them from abroad,
we must also reject, more seriously, the aggression against us in the name of
Islam by some who claim to be Muslims”. For those who have been questioning
whether or not Muslims have undertaken any self-reflection following 11th September,
perhaps one can refer them to such progressive – some would argue truly Islamic
- sentiments and official statements that are, contrary to the often negative
assumptions that link Islam directly with acts of terrorism, in fact representative
of a vast body of Muslim scholarly opinion. Majid al-Khoei is not the only reputable
Islamic leader, resident in the United Kingdom, who thinks that it goes without
saying that the perpetrators of such atrocities – in this case Usama bin Laden
– usually have no standing to issue an Islamic religious opinion, or Fatwa.
In the wake of 11th September, Muslim leaders and representative bodies, such
as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) have rounded on extremist figures such
as the leader of the fundamentalist al-Muhajiroun group, Omar Bakri Mohammed
(who are calling for a worldwide ‘caliphate’), and Shaykh Abu Hamza of the Finsbury
Park Mosque in London, even going so far as referring to such ‘scholars’ – and
not in any flippant sense either - as ‘clowns and loonies’.Widely respected
modern scholars of Islam, such as Professor Akbar S Ahmed, who is currently
at the American University in Washington DC, have made it clear for a long time
that the actions of hijackers and terrorists, even when carried out in the name
of religion, have absolutely nothing to do with Islamic theology and can only
be understood in the political context (3). The Cambridge University Muslim
scholar, Tim Winter, is similarly unequivocal. An insurrectionist who kills
non-combatants is guilty of baghi, armed transgression, a capital offence in
Islamic law, he argues. The proclamations of bin Laden, which ignore fourteen
centuries of Muslim scholarship, amounts to an extreme violation of the normal
methods of Islamic scholarship. Had the authors of such ‘fatwas’ followed the
norms of their religion, they would have had to acknowledge that no school of
traditional Islam allows the targeting of civilians. A military Jihad (which
Islamic scholars are keen to point out is a ‘lesser’ Jihad, the ‘greater’ being
the Jihad, or struggle, of one’s own self or against one’s own selfishness)
can be proclaimed only by a properly constituted state; “anything else is pure
vigilantism”.In the Islamic world itself, the General Mufti (al-Mufti al-‘Amm)
of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Shaykh, issued
an official statement that condemned the 11th September attack as ‘criminal’
on the grounds that Islam forbids hijacking of planes, the terrorizing of innocent
people, and the shedding of blood. He had already, in fact months before these
attacks, condemned suicide bombings, distinguishing between ‘regular suicide’
(intihar), which was absolutely forbidden in Islam, and martyrdom (istishhad),
for which there were limited and conditional exceptions. Even most radicals
agree that suicide in and of itself is a major sin forbidden in Islam (4). However,
the more extreme use Qur’anic verses, ‘ahadiths (Traditions) and cases from
the early history of Islam to try and prove that voluntary sacrifice in the
cause of Islam with the objective of defending Muslims and hurting their enemies
is not suicide but a legitimately sanctioned action, permissible as a form of
fulfilling the individual duty (fard ‘ayn) of Jihad (of which more later). Shaykh
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Head of the Department of Sunnah Studies at the University
of Qatar and a leading Sunni theologian, argues that suicide bombings are ‘heroic
operations of martyrdom’, have nothing to do with suicide, and ‘are the supreme
form of Jihad for the sake of Allah, and a type of terrorism (!) that is allowed
by the Shari’a’. All scholars agree, however, that someone attempting to end
their life for personal reasons is committing a forbidden act of suicide. Muhammad
Sayyed Tantawi, Shaykh of al-Azhar, argues that suicide operations are to be
regarded as martyrdom if the intention is to kill enemy soldiers but not women
or children. Qaradawi responds that they are legal even if women and children
are killed because Israeli society is militaristic by nature and women serve
in its army. However, children and the elderly should not be targeted, though
if they are killed accidentally this can be excused by the principle of Necessity
“which justifies what is forbidden”.
Muslim jurists have historically not focused on the idea of just cause for war
(5). Building upon the proscriptions of the Holy Prophet, jurists insisted that
there are legal restrictions upon the conduct of war: Muslim armies may not
kill non-combatants. Vegetation and property may not be destroyed, waterholes
may not be poisoned, torture, mutilation and murder of hostages is forbidden
under any circumstances. Importantly, the classical jurists reached these determinations
not simply as a matter of textual interpretation, but as moral or ethical assertions.
The classical juristic approach to terrorism was quite different, however, and
those who refused to concede legitimacy to the juristic class were deemed muharib
(lit. those who fight society). The denial of juristic legitimacy and the later
development of theological Salafism is an interesting comparative. Although
classical jurists agreed on the definition of a muharib, they disagreed
about which types of criminal acts should be considered crimes of terror. Nevertheless,
“the terrorizing of the defenceless was recognized as a moral wrong and an offence
against society and God”.
The debate surrounding the legitimacy,
or not, of suicide attacks has been a hot potato in Islamic scholarship for
many years. Contemporary scholarship across the spectrum of Islamic schools
of jurisprudence (fiqh) remains divided on this issue, but intriguingly not
on sectarian lines. The head of the Supreme Judicial Council in Saudi Arabia,
Shaykh Salih al-Luheidan, said that it was incumbent upon his country to denounce
the attacks as the Kingdom was ruled by Shari’a. He pointed out that the Saudi
‘Ulema (religious scholars, both Sunni and Wahhabi) have in the past specifically
denounced the hijacking of planes, viewing such a crime as a prohibited and
unacceptable act, irrespective of who the passengers were, “because terrorizing
any person is viewed as Perversion” in Islamic Law. In the Islamic Republic
of Iran, which is a Shi’a theocracy, President Sayyed Muhammad Khatami, a renowned
scholar in his own right, equally condemned the attacks of 11th September, and
asked for “the search and destruction of the roots of terrorism”. Ayatullah
Hassan Rouhani, the powerful Secretary of Iran’s National Security Council,
called for “international cooperation against terrorism”. And the influential
senior cleric, Ayatullah Kashani, described the attacks as ‘catastrophic’, demanding
‘global mobilization’ against the perpetrators.
Most of the Muslim scholars who condemn
terrorism, especially when it uses religion as a weapon or tool, insist that
the Qur’an emphatically supports their view. Ayatullah Sayyed Fadhil Milani,
a leading Shi’a theologian based in London, included the following oft-quoted
verses to support what one might refer to as the progressivist Islamic view:
Take not life, which God hath made sacred,
except by way of justice and law.
If anyone kills a human being for other
than manslaughter or for spreading corruption on earth - it shall be as though
he had killed all mankind; whereas, if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though
he had saved the lives of all mankind. (6: 51)
If they hold aloof from you and wage
not war against you and offer you peace, God allows you no way against them.(4:90)
If the enemy incline towards peace,
do you (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God: for He is the One that
Heareth and Knoweth (all things).(8:61)
Let there be no compulsion in religion:
Truth stands out clear from Error.(2:256).
Such scholars also use the pro-integrationist
argument that Muslims are commanded by God to be good citizens and good community
members wherever they live, and to leave the place a better one because they
lived in it. Other scholars, like the moderate Shaykh Fadhil Sahlani (6), director
of Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation in New York, who participated in the official
remembrance ceremony at Yankee Stadium, New York, for the victims of the 11th
September attacks, argue that is an integral part of the fundamental duties
of a believer to take active part in the social and the political process of
a community in order to make positive changes, not only for themselves, but
for others as well. His approach is both ecumenical and grassroot.
The effectiveness of the consultations
between Western government and Muslim representatives can be discerned by the
more recent statements of those in the vanguard of the military coalition against
terror. President George W Bush, despite his initial knee-jerk reaction to the
event of 11th September, has since acknowledged to Congress that the terrorists
who are the target of “the war on terrorism” practice a fringe form of Islamic
extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of
Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.
The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack
Islam itself, he said.
EAST-WEST MULTILOGUE
In the West, Muslim leaders have been
in a constructive process of consultation with senior politicians for almost
a decade, and in the wake of September 11 that level of consultation has markedly
increased, particularly in the United Kingdom. Throughout such meetings, representatives
of Islamic organizations have reaffirmed – both publicly and in private - their
condemnation of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. For its part,
the British Government has reassured the Muslim community that they would do
everything in their power to protect them from the violent “backlash” that was
expected after the 11th September attacks. (7) In a meeting following these
attacks, which was also attended by Tessa Jowell MP (British Secretary of State,
Department for Culture, Media and Sport), and John Denham MP (Home Office Minister
with responsibility for policing and community safety), Home Secretary David
Blunkett unreservedly condemned attacks on Muslims or Muslim communities in
the wake of September 11th: “This is not a question of east versus west, it
is about protecting the freedoms our democracy enshrines. These are values shared
and upheld by Muslims throughout Britain. I have made it absolutely clear to
the police that protecting those under threat or attack is an absolute priority
and I will continue to monitor this closely”. Tessa Jowell added, “We cannot
and should not equate the actions of a group of terrorists with all the followers
of Islam. Everyone – including the media – must remember that. This is a time
for our country to unite, not divide”.
But whilst a sophisticated level of
interaction between some Muslim representatives and government machinery is
apparent – despite criticisms of elitism and opportunism among some representatives
both individual and institutional - the flipside of such progress is the reality
of “the street”, where even before 11th September there was in evidence a marked
increase in racist violence throughout Europe and a disturbing growth in fascist
parties recruiting mainly young unemployed men whose strong plank now appeared
to be to target Muslims and Muslim religious and cultural symbols. Islamophobia,
which might be described as a relatively new yet equally vile form of racism
which is also known as anti-muslimism, is a type of racism, it is argued (8)
wherein “you are hated because of the way you dress. You are hated because of
the views you might hold. You are hated because of the religion you uphold.
You are hated not just for what you are but for what you, in the eyes of others,
might become”.
Terrorism does not have a race, religion
or nationality, as John Austin MP (Erith and Thamesmead) reminded the British
House of Commons following criticisms of Muslim community representatives not
having been vocal enough in their condemnation of the terror attacks by former
British prime minister, now Baroness, Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, quiet mutterings
of anger and hostility among ordinary people (the “backlash” referred to) have,
of course, not been helped by the rantings of certain leaders, notably Italy’s
premier, Silvio Berlusconi, who went as far as to claim that the West should
be “confident in the superiority of our civilization” over the Muslim world.
His, and Thatcher’s, outburst is indicative of a mode of thinking today that
pits Islam and the West at opposite ends of a very convenient, and easy to explain,
civilizational spectrum which vindicates not only religious millennialists but
also excuses a lack of clear foreign policy direction, notably on the part of
the greater international powers.
ISLAMOPHOBIA
The European Union’s race watchdog this year accused a wide range of British
commentators, politicians and media of helping to foster an upsurge in anti-Islamic
feeling after 11th September. In a BBC Online survey (9),
approximately half of blacks and Asians said that they believed the police in
Britain to be racist, vindicating the findings of The Macpherson Report (10)
into the murder of the London teenager, Stephen Lawrence, which had earlier
labelled the Metropolitan Police institutionally racist.
In its report, Islamophobia, (11) the European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia (EUMC) reported that the biggest rise in violent attacks had
taken place in Britain, Holland, Sweden, and “most of all” Denmark. Women wearing
the hejab, or headscarf, had been “insulted, spat at, beaten and even
raped” in a wave of attacks across Europe, causing many to stop wearing the
garment in public. EUMC monitored the period from 11 September 2001 until the
end of December 2001.
According to figures compiled by Islamic organizations in the United Kingdom,
the rate of attacks on British Muslims since 11th September is more
than thirteen times higher than in a typical year. More than four hundred attacks
since that date, ranging from nuisance calls to fire-bombings, were logged by
a team of three hundred field workers across Britain. The dossier, compiled
by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (12), shows that Britain’s Muslims are
living in an atmosphere of heightened hostility and mistrust, which has continued
during the campaign in Afghanistan and after the arrests of British Muslim individuals
suspected of links to ainternational terrorist activities. The commission said
the number of incidents reported was more than four times as many as recorded,
on average, in any twelve month period.
The UK has been at the forefront of addressing the issue of Islamophobia and
antimuslimism for far longer than have her European counterparts. Islamophobia,
according to the Runnymede Trust report (13), which was probably the first coherent
study of the phenomenon, is “a dual demonization of Muslims at home and abroad”.
That process, perhaps more than any other, kicked into gear a renewed fervour
both among Muslim representatives and the government to look more seriously
into the issue of discrimination and racism based not on ethnicity or skin colour
but specifically religious persuasion. An important element of this has been,
almost by definition if not force of circumstance, Islamophobia’s relationship
with anti-Semitism. This has, over the years, led to an enhanced contact between
Muslim and Jewish organizations as well as individuals from both faiths eager
to learn from each other’s historical and contemporary experiences (such as,
for instance, the development of The Maimonides Foundation in London, and the
regular meetings of Muslims and Jews under the auspices of The Stone-Ashdown
Trust, also in London). Of course, senior Jewish figures have always been prominent
in interfaith committees, but the Judaeo-Islamic platform is a relatively new
and fascinating arena of cooperation and outreach from which there is surely
much to be gained.
Perhaps the most significant institutional development relating to the documentation
and highlighting, in the public arena, of the issue of Islamophobia was the
launch, in London in 1999, of FAIR (Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism).
Since their establishment, FAIR have been at the forefront of monitoring the
media and responding to blatantly Islamophobic articles and commentaries by
responding in a rational, thought-out and systematic manner. In May, 2002, following
a season of programmes on Islam and Muslims on Channel Four, FAIR issued their
own detailed critique of the series (14) following meetings held at the instigation
of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport between the Muslim community
and media regulators and organizations. FAIR’s analysis of the dedicated Channel
Four series was a detailed case study of current Islamophobic constructs in
the broadcast media. According to them, in totality the series presented a tendentious
and pejorative view of British Muslims: “As a whole, the series focused on extremism,
segregation, corruption, the hejab and difference. Much of the journalistic
comment, for instance, based its analysis on a “closed view” of Islam, as articulated
in the Runnymede Commission report (above). Thus, “the main concern was the
overall negative stereotyping of a vulnerable religious minority at a sensitive
time”. This stereotyping was based on “a persistent focus upon difference, thereby
promoting the idea that being British and Muslim is conflictual, that the two
are hermetically sealed and are therefore incompatible identities”. FAIR’s position
was that the series started with the assumption that British Islam is problematic:
anarchic, extreme, disloyal and deviant”.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM: UK AND USA
UK
Details of the British Government’s legislative package to combat terrorism
(Emergency Anti-Terrorist Bill) was outlined by the Home Secretary this year,
who declared in a Home Office press release: “It is the first job of government
and the essence of our democracy that we safeguard rights and freedoms, the
most basic of which is to live safely and in peace. The proposed Bill will include,
inter alia, tough financial controls to staunch the flow of terrorist funding,
powers for account monitoring and swift asset freezing, seizure of cash in-country,
and strict reporting obligations on the financial sector, including making it
an offence for a bank not to report a transaction where it knows or suspects
funds may be intended for terrorist purposes; Measures to allow quicker and
more effective cooperation with fellow European Union (EU) countries on police
and legal issues; An extension of the incitement law to cover religious, as
well as racial hatred (both incitement offences will have an increased maximum
penalty from two years to seven years); A widening of the incitement law
to cover incitement within the United Kingdom of terrorist acts against groups
or individuals overseas and examining additional powers in relation to conspiracy;
A requirement on transport companies to keep passenger and freight information
records and make them available in advance to law enforcement agencies; The
removal of current barriers which prevent customs and revenue officers providing
information to law enforcement agencies in their fight against terrorism; Measures
to enable communication service providers to retain data generated in the course
of their business, namely the records of calls made and other data - not the
content; The strengthening of security at airports and for passengers; Expanding
the role and jurisdiction of the British Transport Police, together with those
working on enforcement from the Ministry of Defence and the Atomic Energy Authority;
Powers to give the police and customs services the authority to demand the removal
of facial covering or gloves; Clauses to close the gaps in the present legislation
relating to chemical, nuclear and biological weapons to prevent the use, production,
possession or participation in unauthorized transfers of these materials; Fingerprints
taken in immigration and asylum retained for up to ten years in order to improve
identification of individuals”.
The Bill would also “contain robust and streamlined procedures for dealing with
those suspected of terrorist acts who seek to misuse asylum and immigration”.
These measures would, inter alia, remove access to judicial review in decisions
made by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, the body that deals with
suspected terrorists’ asylum claims; Enable asylum claims to be rejected where
the Secretary of State certifies the person is a threat to national security;
And detain those who are a terrorist threat but who cannot be removed from the
country, whilst retaining a right of appeal. This would require a limited suspension
from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), using ECHR
Article 15 which allows for suspension in the event of a public emergency: “This
will ensure we remain consistent with our international obligations, including
the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees”, according to the press release.
The Home Secretary also told Parliament that in addition to the Emergency Anti-Terrorist
Bill described above, he intended to bring forward an Extradition Bill “to modernize
and place British laws within the context of the new international situation”.
Such legislative measures were designed, he stipulated, to protect and enhance
rights, not diminish them, “otherwise future generations would never forgive
us”.
USA
Many commentators (15) have remarked that America’s anger in the wake of
the 11th September attacks is understandable and although one agrees
that the United States has a legitimate claim in finding those it believes perpetrated
this crime on its soil, one has to caution that this is not, was never, and
should not be allowed to become 'America’s war”, as is still sensationally suggested
in caption-form on the Fox News channel, for example. Terrorism was there
before 11th September and many countries – particularly within the
Muslim world – have faced the cold calculating wrath of the terrorist for years.
Thus, the issue of tackling the roots of terrorism is one that is as relevant
for America as it is for other countries. Timothy McVeigh, for example, was
neither Muslim nor foreign to America. And grinding poverty, exploitation, and
corruption are American problems just as much as – if not to the same extent
- they are problems of 'other” countries (16).
In the United States, the mood since 11th September, 2001, has been
decidedly hawkish, if not purposefully bellicose. Rather worryingly, some commentators
on the more extreme end of the 'you are either with us or against us” camp,
such as the right-wing Daniel Pipes (17) seem to be concerned that the Washington
does not officially view Islam as inherently hostile to American 'values”, and
suggests that 'the American ‘street’ does not view Islam as positively as do
American politicians. He further likens the Administration’s attitude to a kind
of 'appeasement”, a fantastic and dangerous turn of phrase - as if respecting
the civil rights of American citizens who happen to be Muslim is tantamount
to appeasing terrorism.
Unfortunately, Pipes is not alone in his peculiarly Islamophobic hysteria. R
James Woolsey, former director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), has
spoken publicly of ‘the Red Menace that dominated our lives for nearly a half
a century’ now being replaced by a ‘Green Menace sweeping throughout the Arab
world’ (18). Sentiments such as those expressed by the likes of Pipes and Woolsey
may have had some encouragement from the rhetoric employed by President George
W Bush in the immediate aftermath of 11th September when he clearly
invoked the spirit of the medieval crusades. This was a badly calculated response,
particularly when one considers how loaded the issue of the Crusades remains
between some Christians and Muslims, as well as Jews, in parts of the world.
US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, described by former US ambassador
Robert D Crane as 'the number-one reactionary conservative in the Bush administration”
(19), was one of the earliest official voices who argued that one could only
eliminate evil by eliminating states. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, as
the leading principled or traditionalist conservative, eventually sided with
the Government’s leading liberal, Secretary of State General Colin Powell, in
declaring that victory against terrorism can come only from attacking poverty,
illiteracy, and hunger as the breeding ground for tolerance of terrorism. Neither
one suggested that the root of terrorism could be US foreign policies, in other
words that the crisis is political rather than religious or civilizational.
The Arabocentric dimension of United States domestic policy vis-à-vis the perceived
threat to homeland security is not exclusive to the 'post-9/11” scenario. The
controversial 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act had earlier allowed
the INS to 'arrest, detain and deport non-citizens on the basis of ‘secret evidence’
- whose source and substance is not revealed to the potential deportees or their
counsel”, which civil rights lawyers at the time described as an unconstitutional
measure used especially against Muslims and Arabs.
Earlier this year, a joint resolution, adopted by the US Senate and the House
of Representatives, authorized the use of America’s armed forces against those
responsible for the 11th September attacks. This resolution (20),
with integrated War Powers Resolution Requirements, allows the President
of the United States (in Section 2) 'to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or [harboured] such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons”.
The abovementioned resolution can be seen as a follow-on from the pre-existing
Executive Order that prohibits transactions with terrorists and their supporters
(21). According to this Executive Order, 'grave acts of terrorism and threats
of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists (acts recognized and condemned
in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, and
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269 of October 19, 1999) constitute
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States”. This Executive Order, which can only be made
by the President, was in furtherance of President Bush’s proclamation days after
the 11th September attacks (22), which declared a national emergency
to deal with that threat: 'Because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of
the financial foundation of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate
for those foreign persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign
terrorists”.
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
At the international level, the most important and far-reaching development
in terms of its effect on individual state responses to terrorist threats came
in the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (23). This pulls together
all previous resolutions dealing with terrorism, and invokes them under Chapter
VII auspices, which deals with threats to, and breaches of, the peace and acts
of aggression. Though it does not define ‘terrorism’, it makes it clear that
the attacks of 11th September can only be defined as terrorism. UNSC
1373 has been described by the more cynical as a blank cheque that intentionally
leaves undefined all of its key terms. Indeed, though Security Council
Resolutions can often be intentionally ambiguous, such constructive ambiguity
as is prevalent within this particular resolution seems extraordinarily exceptional.
Some international lawyers argue that 1373 would be referred to justify action
taken without further Security Council approval (the preambulatory paragraph
reaffirming nations’ rights to self-defence emphasizes that Security Council
Resolutions are not required). By issuing a ‘decision’ about what each country
must do to combat terrorism, Resolution 1373 has created a series of obligations
under International Law that seem to go far beyond anything that existed previously.
A very wide range of activities associated with terrorism are now criminalized,
and countries are supposed to bring their domestic criminal statutes into conformity
with international standards. By specifically referring to the right of self-defence,
the resolution seems to legitimize unilateral military responses by states that
are either attacked by non-state actors or fear that they might be attacked.
Moreover, by creating a 'special action committee” composed of representatives
of the Security Council, and setting a deadline of ninety days to report what
actions have been taken, the resolution has established, at the very least,
the beginning of a permanent international structure to coordinate anti-terrorism
activities. In short, this has repercussions with potentially negative unintended
consequences.
Another important piece of legislation is the new International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (24). This creates an international legal
framework for investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting those involved in
terrorist financing and describes preventive measures to identify and choke
off sources of income for terrorists and to restrict the movements of such funds
across international borders.
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
Returning to the issue of rhetoric, of course, whether rightly or wrongly,
President Bush did declare the September 11th attacks on America
– and any subsequent attacks anywhere - as an act of war, not an act
of terrorism. This throws up an interesting legal and intellectual quandary.
'If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United
States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty”, stated NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Secretary-General,
Lord Robertson, after a meeting of the North Atlantic Council a day after the
attacks on New York City and Washington DC. Article 5 stipulates that an armed
attack against one or several members shall be considered as an attack against
all NATO members. This may also inadvertently have given succour to the view
in Washington itself that a unilateral military response would not only be justiciable
under the circumstances but acceptable by a mere nod and a wink from the other
NATO members. In other words, a unilateral response in its physical manifestation
might equally, symbolically, be interpreted as, in essence, a multilateral response.
Technically, war is defined as a state
of armed hostility between two or more sovereign state entities, and not between
a state entity and a non-state actor. This technicality has no resonance in
practise, however, because neither a declaration of war nor an act of war is
required for the legal use of military force against states or non-state actors,
a principle established in 1812 by US actions against the ‘Barbary Pirates’
of North Africa, as well as examples of so-called gun-boat diplomacy since.
The question is therefore hypothetical: whether the attacks by al-Qa’eda anywhere
can be characterized as state acts because the groups are allegedly linked to,
or supported by, particular states. This raises the legal issue of state responsibility
(25). The view of the International Law Commission of late is that “the conduct
of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under
International Law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying
out the conduct” (Article 8). Article 9 of the ILC Draft Report goes on to state
that, “the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act
of a State under International Law if the person or group of persons is in fact
exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default
of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise
of those elements of authority”.
It would seem, in corollary to the above, that in order for terrorist attacks
to be construed as having an element of state responsibility, then the criteria
of applicability is not just the nature or extent of state involvement, whether
direct or indirect, but the relevance of that specific state involvement in
the act or acts carried out by non-state actors. This would also seem to presuppose
an assumption of there being command responsibility for such acts, which is
already dealt with in other areas of International Law, and could make defensible
asymmetrical responses to assymetrical threats. Indeed, whilst some experts
(26) argue that, despite the unpredictable nature of the asymmetrical threat
from non-state actors, it is widely accepted that unmatched US power (economic,
cultural, diplomatic, and military) is likely to cause America’s adversaries
to favour asymmetric attacks over direct conventional military confrontations,
and that such an attack would be a transforming event, one could argue that
such a position is cyclical in itself. Surely an asymmetrical response, even
from a “sensible” nation state would be equally as unpredictable, and potentially
more dangerous given the precedent it would presumably create in terms of the
legitimacy of state responses to such threats.
Apart from the question of determining who was attacked, a parallel concern
has been what sort of crime might one assume can define such an attack. Geoffrey
Robertson QC, the leading British lawyer, has suggested that the definition
of a ‘crime against humanity’ is wide enough to cover atrocities by a terrorist
group organized on the scale of that which occurred on 11th September.
But many countries, including Britain, insist that it applies only to the acts
of states and not of terrorists, however well organized and politically motivated
those terrorists are, and regardless, presumably, of how and to what extent
these non-state actors are supported. Robertson’s retort is that all belligerent
groups, whether or not attached to a state, should be subject to the laws of
war. That terrorism will henceforth be treated as a crime against humanity therefore
permits the use of force against any sovereign state bearing responsibility
for such a crime.
The argument for treating terrorism as a crime against humanity is not new,
of course. In 1992, Alex Schmid, in a report for the United Nations Crime Branch,
suggested that in order to cut through the Gordian knot of defining terrorism,
it might be a good idea to take the existing consensus on what constitutes a
‘war crime’ as a point of departure. If the core of war crimes – deliberate
attacks on civilians, hostage-taking and the killing of prisoners – is extended
to peacetime, one could simply define acts of terrorism as ‘peacetime equivalents
of war crimes’. In fact, the unintended – yet positive – consequence of such
a definition could be the elimination of the distinction between terrorism by
groups and terrorism by governments.
The issue of state-sponsored, or indeed state-enacted terrorism is one that
few people seem prepared to discuss. And when they do, the debate is often limited
to blaming the so-called ‘rogue states’, as characterized by remarks made by
the Honourable Richard Perle at the Foreign Policy Research Institute Dinner,
November, 2001 (27): “We can’t stop acts of terrorism, but we can reduce it
to the occasional violent act of an individual or two if we can separate the
terrorists from the state sponsorship that provides them with the essential
means of carrying out their evil acts”. However, prominent journalists, such
as The Independent (UK) newspaper’s Robert Fisk, have bravely defied
convention and articulated “the other side of the argument”, bringing to light
the clear discrepancies and contradictions on the part of those forces that
deem themselves to be leading the war against terrorism. Such commentators have
reasonably – indeed convincingly – argued that the ‘holier than thou’ stance
of such powers is replete with hypocrisy. America’s unilateralist show of power
and privilege vis-à-vis its open military hegemonism is viewed with particular
cynicism by the respected war journalist, John Pilger, for instance, who pointed
out in a recent article that, “Western terror is part of the recent history
of imperialism, aword thatjournalists dare not speak or write”. Politicians,
too, such as the Irishman, Conor Cruise O’Brien, have written that, “Those who
are described as terrorists, and reject that title for themselves, make the
uncomfortable point that national armed forces, fully supported by democratic
opinion, have in fact employed violence and terror on a far vast scale than
what liberation forces have yet been able to attain”. Why should the label ‘terrorist’
be applied to ‘freedom-fighters’, for instance, and not to national militaries?
It is thus difficult to avoid the conclusion drawn by historian Frank Furedi
(28), in his 1994 book, The New Ideology of Imperialism, that, “Terrorists
become any foreign people you don’t like”, adding that terrorism is “redefined
to serve as an all-purpose metaphor for the Third World, demanding concerted
action from the West”. Addressing the United States Government directly, Mohsen
Armin, Deputy of the Iranian Majlis, or Parliament, hoped that in the
aftermath of 11th September, a better understanding of the ‘right
of nations’, as opposed to the right of a nation, would ensue.
Such constructive criticisms have also come, significantly, from nearer home.
Dr Charles Graves, Secretary-General of Interfaith International, favours a
global approach to religious ‘fundamentalism’, which the US, as a the “giant
woken from its slumber of complacency” by the attacks of 11th September,
along with its influential international partners, notably the Europeans, ought
to be elaborating within the context of a globalized world (29).
Former US ambassador Robert D Crane argues (30) that the Bush administration
has invoked every possible cause for terrorism other than their own deliberate
foreign policies, policies that have contributed to the terrorist mentality.
He lists among these foreign policies, Chechnya, Kashmir, the Balkans, and Israel:
“Anti-American movements are motivated primarily by active US support of secularized
and xenophobic Zionism”. But whilst a resolution to the Palestine/Israel Question
is doubtless essential, it is perhaps a little oversimplification to suggest
that it is the only factor behind Islamism and the only or primary reason for
radicalization in the Muslim world, ignoring other factors (such as disparities
in wealth, totalitarianism, poverty, repression of individual liberties, elitist
control of state structures and institutions). However, few can argue with Crane’s
illuminating argument that “the greatest challenge to Americans’ commitment,
courage and creativity lies not in enforcing stability through military might,
which can never succeed in the long run, but in building security through foreign
policies that address the political roots of terrorism”. It is this unilateral
militarism versus multilateral justice dichotomy that has to be contextualized
in order to galvanize an effective response to global terrorism, and will help
as a practical process of engagement towards a common definition of terrorism.
Questions of definition, particularly but not exclusively in relation to terrorism,
have been addressed throughout various international fora within the so-called
developing world, for some time. At the OIC (31) meeting in Doha, in October
2001, the need to convene an international conference to define terrorism and
draft a practical international plan to combat it, “provided the sovereignty
of member states is respected within the framework of International Law” was
underlined by Shaykh al-Thani, who hosted the high-level meeting. The conference
was, moreover, mindful of the fact that most ‘Ulema distrusted any definition
that might be imposed on them, although theoretically they too would want a
universal definition. Definitions of terrorism can be slippery (32). If the
definition is too broad, law enforcement’s reach could undermine civil liberties.
Likewise, too broad a target for military response could do more harm than good.
Clearly, the definition and perceived severity of terrorism will shift according
to political perspectives. That there is a need for a working, operational definition
of terrorism is not in doubt. However, such a definition has to be sophisticated,
and customized for each case (33).
ISLAMISM
“Nothing has so diminished Islam in recent times as its politicization”
(34), said Dr Kanan Makiyya at a symposium in October 2002, which explored contingency
options in the event that the regime of President Saddam Hussein in Iraq should
fall (note that this paper is being written at a time of heightened tension
when, as vaguely part of the war against terrorism, Iraq has been given an ultimatum
by an international coalition, led by the United States, to surrender its weapons
of mass destruction or face an attack by the said coalition). The quality of
Islamic education, scholarship and spiritual guidance declined dramatically,
he argues, once the nationalist secular regimes of the post-colonial period
came into existence and took over these functions.
An Islamist – and again we are on a sticky wicket so far as an agreeable definition
is concerned - might be defined as one who follows one of the varieties of political
or politicized Islam that has grown since the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt in 1928, and has become especially strong since ca.1970. This covers
a range of views from moderate, gradualist to violent or terrorist / militant.
Most Islamists believe in the application of a divinely-ordained Shari’a as
the basic law, though they may differ in their interpretation of it. They also
tend to be hostile to most governments of Muslim-majority states and to the
policies of the West, especially the US, and to state this hostility in (partially) Islamic
terms, which are in turn rejected by those scholars within Islam who deny any
link between violent, overtly political struggles (however socially legitimate)
and the religious faith of over a billion people.
The radical Islamist movement is a modern phenomenon, existing in a symbiotic
relationship with other trends (35). It is rooted in the recurring cycles of
revivals characteristic of Muslim history and is also a reaction to the severe
crisis of modernity converging with the rise of charismatic prophetic leaders.
It constitutes a religious reform movement and a political ideology that includes
a social element of protest and a search for identity by the have-nots of the
Muslim world against an oppressive world order. Islamist thought is, according
to Dr S Parvez Manzoor (36), moving in a direction that makes all compromise
with the modern ethos almost impossible. “It conceives of the imperatives of
Islamic commitment in such fundamentalist terms that the very idea of a dialogue
with the agencies of contemporary history appears heretical. Thus, for all its
determination to bring Islam back to history, radical Islamist thinking promotes
a worldview that is vehemently anti-political, just as it endorses a politics
of revival that is blatantly anti-historical”.
The extent to which religion and politics are intertwined in the Arab / Muslim
world is in itself a contentious issue. Graham E Fuller (37), a former director
of the CIA who is now a senior thinker within the Rand Corporation think-tank,
is of the view that by seeking to separate Islam from politics, the West ignores
the reality that the two are intricately intertwined across a broad swath of
the globe from northern Africa to South-East Asia. Although his argument, that
political Islam, or Islamism, “remains the most powerful ideological force”
in the Muslim world is a persuasive and logical one, his analysis seems to overlook
the growing body of scholarship within the Muslim world that is, contrary
to standard expectation, developing inherently Islamic theses opposing political
Islamism as a legitimate third way within the intellectual world of Islam. Fuller’s
hypothesis is therefore relevant to the Muslim social reality as it relates
to the contemporary political and economic status quo ante in the Muslim world,
but somewhat ignores the development of Muslim intellectual thought outside
of a peculiarly Islamist context. Whilst one might accept his assertion that
the Islamist phenomenon has multiple forms that are spreading, evolving, and
diversifying, it is perhaps a little wishful and unfair to place the immense
diversity of opinion and tendency within the Muslim world under the convenient
banner of “Islamism”. Islamism is indeed a powerful ideology but it is largely
alien to the Islam that is daily practised by the mass of the ordinary faithful.
But Islamism is about reform, modernism, and change, and about the convenience
of using religion to justify political motivations and political ends. There
are aspects of Islamism that have nought to do with religion, hence the fanaticism
of the cold calculating wrath of the terrorist. Most Western observers, inadvertently
or not, fall into the almost inevitable trap of an Orientalist worldview. Hence
the relative ease with which Islam in toto is dissected and inevitably
distorted, often to the point of caricature. Indeed, even the political evolution
of Liberal Islamism is less a reflection of Islam as faith as it is a polemical
exercise in apologetics. Islamism is a challenge to Islam, and it is only now
that we are beginning to understand not only its inner dynamics but where exactly
its origins might lie.
THE ENIGMA OF UBL (1956-2001/2?): DEAD OR ALIVE?
Graham Fuller correctly assumes that the war on terrorism has dealt a major
blow to the personnel, infrastructure, and operations of Usama bin Laden’s al-Qa’eda
network. At the time of writing, a mysterious audiotape has been aired on the
al-Jazeera satellite channel claiming to be the latest message from bin
Laden, heretofore presumed to be have died during the allied attack on his hideout
in the Tora Bora cave complex of the Hindu Kush mountains in Afghanistan. Chillingly
succinct, the existence of the tape feeds into another, growing phenomenon from
the fallout of the 11th September attacks – speculation as to whether
the enigmatic Mr bin Laden is in fact alive or dead. Conjecture in this area
is obviously futile, so I will not dwell. But what is worth considering is the
background of Usama bin Laden and his previous known messages, which were videotaped,
not audio-taped. In perhaps his most famous (38), bin Laden commented in the
aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington: “These events have divided
the world into two camps, the camp of the faithful and the camp of infidels
.. Every Muslim must rise to defend his religion”.
It is clear from this message that bin Laden perceives himself to be a legitimate
Islamic authority who can declare war, rally other Muslims – and non-Muslims
- to his cause, and furthermore assumes his position to be politically unchallengeable.
Yet it is a position that renowned authorities from nearly all the Islamic schools
of thought have unhesitatingly rejected (see above, Introduction). It
is also clear from the statement that what drives him in addition to his fanatical
interpretation of Islam in almost purely political terms is an emotional anger
against the imposition of foreign forces on Saudi soil, perhaps a reflection
that his peculiar brand of Islamism is tinged by an irresistible ultra-nationalist
agenda, a sort of post-Islamist answer to the politically defunct pan-Arabism
that held sway over the previous generation of Arab activists. The 1998 Declaration
of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders, said
to have been issued as a directive by al-Qa’eda, described the US presence in
Saudi Arabia as “a catastrophe” that had humiliating and debilitating effects
on the Muslim people. Bin Ladin’s interpretation of the US presence, and his
solution, was uniquely not only historically determinant and retributive, but
psychotic and irrational.
Throughout the Declaration cited above, the emphasis is on power, authority
and control, which experts say is characteristic of a self-delusional grandeur
of a cult leader. That he refers to his declarations as Fatwas is further proof
of his self-delusion, a product of being cocooned by yes-men with guns and flattery. His
focus on the US is obsessive, and his ability to dichotomize his position vis-à-vis
that of his perceived enemies is not untypical of a cult leader.
According to experts (39), key elements of a cult are deception and manipulation,
as well as adoration of a charismatic leader. The latter in turn helps
inflate the ego of the cult member. Cult members, despite belonging to
a religion, are often not conventionally religious, believing that rules and
conventions can be suspended by the enormous charisma of their leader or organization. It
is legitimate to deceive and take advantage of outsiders and even to destroy
them. If a charismatic leader and community can convince a cult member
that a suicidal act is the ultimate in ego inflation, they can sometimes induce
it. Cult members need not commit suicide as a pious act guaranteeing them
paradise; they might do it simply because they have been conditioned to give
absolute obedience to their leader and been convinced that thereby they will
achieve some key goal that is highly significant to their cults’ identity.
Bin Laden has been described as both Wahhabi and Salafi in persuasion. Salafism
(40) was founded in the late 19th Century by Muslim reformers such as Muhammad
‘Abduh, al-Afghani and Rashid Rida, and taught simply that Muslims ought to
follow the precedent of the Prophet and his companions (al-salaf al-salih).
Methodologically, Salafism was nearly identical to Wahhabism except that Wahhabism
is far less tolerant of diversity and differences of opinion. The founders of
Salafism maintained that on all issues Muslims ought to return to the Qur’an
and the sunna (precedent) of the Prophet. In doing so, Muslims ought
to reinterpret the original sources in light of modern needs and demands, without
being slavishly bound to the interpretations of earlier Muslim generations.
According to el-Fadl, by emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam, Salafis
idealized the time of the Prophet and his companions, and ignored or demonized
the balance of Islamic history.
But to understand the enigma of Bin Laden more fully, it is necessary to enquire
about the religion of bin Ladin and to ask whether it has more in common with
movements that arise out of a ‘cultic milieu’, which is a parallel religious
tradition of disparaged and deviant interpretations and practices that challenge
the authority of prevailing religions with rival claims to truth. These upstart
movements are dynamic and novel, but usually short-lived. They adhere to an
alternative theology that they regard as more authoritative than the laws, rituals,
and interpretations that define their parent religions. The cultic milieu is
the dynamic seedbed of novel interpretations of sacred matters out of which
new religious communities take shape. The great majority of new groups are benign.
A small number mutate into organizations such as al-Qa’eda that justify violence
as a theological imperative. These ‘spectacular’ religions commit shocking acts
of suicide and homicide, and include the religious movements of Jonestown, the
Order of the Solar Temple, Heaven’s Gate, and Aum Shinrikyo.
Al-Qa’eda, therefore, appears to fit the definitions of a cult: it indoctrinates
its members; it forms a closed, totalitarian society; it has a self-appointed,
messianic and charismatic leader; and it believes that the ends justify the
means. The organization is expert in its psychology. First, like all cults,
it teaches its members to subordinate their individuality to the goal of the
group. Then it demands that they follow certain rituals. Members are persuaded
to give up their own lives for the promise of a paradise.
Bin Laden’s personal history is also integral to understanding his self-proclaimed
mission and the creation of al-Qa’eda. Born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1957,
he was the 17th of 57 children born to a billionaire Yemeni construction magnate
whose company had become fabulously wealthy on contracts to renovate the mosques
of Mecca and Medina. He spent time in Beirut in the early 1970s living the lifestyle
of a playboy and was reportedly a heavy drinker with a rowdy reputation (see
Orbach). The war in Afghanistan and the triumph over the Soviet Union, a superpower,
was a personal turning point of redemptive proportions. Inspired, he arrived
in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1988, bringing with him donations for the war effort.
His Arab followers were trained by American, Pakistani and Saudi intelligence
services who were funding the Afghan resistance against the Russians at the
time. Al-Qa’eda (lit. The Base) was established in Peshawar a year later as
a service centre for Arab-Afghans and their families and to promote Wahabbism
- the puritanical brand of Islam that had historically condemned even Sunni
Muslims as heretics - among the Afghans. As the decade of the 1990s began, and
disillusioned with the incessant in-fighting among the various ethnic Afghan
factions, he returned to Saudi Arabia where he became a vocal critic of the
ruling al-Sauds’ decision to allow in American troops to attack Iraq after the
invasion of Kuwait. He was exiled to Sudan, and moved again to Afghanistan –
now almost entirely under Taleban control - in 1996, fearing that his Sudanese
hosts might cave into pressure from the Saudis to extradite him.
Bin-Laden is thus not an impassioned revolutionary radical seeking social justice
for the poor and oppressed (41). Nor is he the product of harassment, imprisonment
and torture at the hand of Muslim regimes. Rather, bin-Laden is a product of
traditional Saudi Wahhabism, enjoying riches and a privileged position until
his radicalization in the Afghan wars. He focuses on Jihad in the traditionalist
political dichotomous sense.
JIHAD
“The manipulation of the concept of warfare to mobilize followers into activism
can easily blur the distinctions between terms that symbolize moral and spiritual
battle, such as Jihad, and their reinterpretation in specific contexts to legitimize
violent struggle excused by an ‘ends justifies the means’ ideology” (Zeidan).
It is the deviant interpretation of jihad as an obligation to
kill unbelievers that sets the Islamist terrorist apart from Islam. In classical
Islamic scholarship (42), Imam Raghib divides jihad into three categories:
to fight against enemies; against Satan; and against one’s own self, that is,
against one’s own greed and selfishness. He maintains that the Qur’anic verse,
“And strive hard for Allah with due striving. He has chosen you and has not
laid any hardship in religion” (22:78) comprises all these three categories.
Dr Robert D Crane refers to additional verses in the Qur’an that, he says, do
not use the word Jihad in the sense of war but in the sense of striving
with wealth and one’s own life. Indeed, he is emphatic in arguing that Jihad
is nowhere in the Qur’an “used either in the sense of war or for seeking revenge.
Seeking revenge amounts to using concept of Jihad for selfish ends even if revenge
or retaliation be for one’s own group or community”.
Crane supports his view with Hadith literature which prohibits Muslims from
seeking revenge. Specifically, he quotes Sahih Bukhari wherein is contained
the Hadith of Miqdad ibn Amr al-Kindi who asked the Holy Prophet: “Suppose
I met one of the infidels and we fought. He struck one of my hands with his
sword, cut it off and then took refuge in a tree and said, ‘I surrender to Allah’.
Could I kill him, O Messenger of Allah, after he had said this?” Allah’s Messenger
(peace be upon him) said, “you should not kill him”. Al-Miqdad said, “O Allah’s
Messenger, but he had cut off my hands, and then he had uttered those
words.” Allah’s Messenger replied, “You should not kill him, and you would be
in his position where he had been before uttering these words.” Thus, in
matters of war Islam teaches a higher morality, the essence of which is not
to seek revenge or retaliate. This transcendent morality – which is incorporated
into Islamic legal philosophy - rejects the concept of retaliation and enjoins
the higher morality of pardoning the enemy and magnanimity of treatment.
But according to El-Fadl (see sources), the moral foundations that once mapped
out Islamic law and theology have disintegrated. The juristic discourses on
hostility to the use of terror are no longer part of the normative categories
of contemporary Muslims. There are many factors that contributed to this modern
reality, according to El-Fadl. “Among the pertinent factors is the undeniably
traumatic experience of colonialism, which dismantled the traditional institutions
of civil society”.
In the Shi’a (Twelver, or Ithna’ Ashari, also known as Imami)
school of thought (43), the word Jihad literally means ‘endeavour’. There
is grand endeavour and a minor endeavour. Minor endeavour means a military campaign
restricted by the imperatives of the grand endeavour, though there is the Jihad
based upon pre-emptive and preventive defence. However, any type of aggression
is forbidden in the time of the Greater Occultation of the Awaited Saviour,
Imam-e-Zaman, al-Mahdi. It may be interesting briefly to consider the view of
Grand Ayatullah Sayyed Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini (1902-1989), the much misunderstood
jurist and leader of the Iranian Revolution, who had, through his earlier scholarly
writings prior to his political ascendancy, stressed that man’s worst enemy
is the lower self within. Khomeini’s view was that it is useless to engage in
other Jihads before succeeding in the Jihad against one’s own selfish desires.
ISLAMIC PERSPECTVES
From an Islamic legal perspective, the requirements of justice are not just
a necessity they are imperative to understanding and tackling terrorism from
its root causes to its political manifestations. According to many scholars
of Islam, terrorism in all its forms is antithetical to Islamic law and society.
Whilst Shi’a intellectual scholarship has always been subject to a dynamic process
of ijtihad (juristic conclusions based upon the requirements of reasoning
and rationality with due regard to the exigencies of a changing world), contemporary
Sunni legal scholars often refer to Imam al-Shatibi who, six centuries ago,
developed guidelines for developing and applying Islamic law (shari’ah)
in the form of a set of Islamic universal principles (kulliyat), essentials
(dururiyat), or purposes (maqasid), and explained that the number
and inner tectonics of these maqasid are flexible according to time
and place.
THE ROOT CAUSES
Terrorism has no quick fix solution, according to His Royal Highness Prince
El-Hassan bin Talal, who goes on to argue that the only way forward is a diplomatically
creative policy that will work towards conflict prevention and conflict resolution
through good management (44). Prince El-Hassan talks persuasively of “too many
unacceptables remaining in our developing world”, of the unacceptable level
of illiteracy (850 million throughout the world), the unacceptable lack of access
to electricity for over a two billion people, the unacceptable fact that thirteen
million people die from hunger every year, and the unacceptable persistence
of disease in parts of the world whose victims are children as well as adults.
CONCLUSION
“The atrocity of September 11 is a violation of Islamic law and ethics. Neither
the people who were killed or injured, nor the properties that were destroyed,
qualified as legitimate targets in any system of law, especially Islamic law”,
according to the London-based Islamic scholar and deputy of the Shaykh al-Azhar,
Shaykh Dr Zaki Badawi (45). Shaykh Badawi, like other scholars, refers to the
farewell sermon of the Prophet Muhammad: “God has made inviolable for you each
others’ blood and each others’ property until you meet your Lord”, a reiteration
of the Qur’anic decree that to destroy the life of one individual amounts to
destroying the entire human race (5:32).
Contemporary Muslim societies, however, have been largely shaped by the more
recent legacy of their colonial subjugation. Their comparative development has
therefore been stifled so that the social reality in these societies is, in
many cases, poverty, illiteracy or lack of access to education, elitist maintenance
of the status quo through military muscle, environmental degradation, lack of
rule of law and civil liberties. This has to be acknowledged “if we are to gain
insight into the grave phenomena emerging in the Islamic world” (46). The intensely
intricate nature of the Islamic socio-political situation marked by striking
contradictions and strong tensions is better understood when viewed within the
context of the waves of Western imperialist expansion, of the crises of the
post-colonial state and the reality of social deprivation, economic dependence
and decadent educational systems unable to fill the vacuum generated by the
erosion of traditional learning centres, along with the marginalization of the
Muslim masses from the political system.
islamic legal scholars, in responding to the challenge of Islamism and terrorism,
have to help develop a progressive platform that is uniquely Islamic within
the framework of political reformation and in relation to universally shared
values. Muslim political leadership has to enlist the religious and spiritual
leadership in a constructive engagement towards delegitimizing terrorism and
terrorists, and that involves to some extent creating an enabling environment
for the legislative deconstruction of political Islamism when it seen to be
contrary to peace and stability (47).
The crisis of international terrorism is about legitimacy: the legitimacy of
terror; the legitimacy of responding to terror. In the latter context it is
about the legitimacy of the nature of response and engagement, whether unilateral,
bilateral or multilateral; whether military, psychological or diplomatic. It
is also about the legitimacy of harbouring terrorism; and about the legitimacy
of anger, frustration and despair against a growing gap between the rich and
the poor. The delegitimization of terrorists and terrorism (48) within the world
of Islam involves a diplomatic process that will gather Islamic religious and
political opinion from the widest spectrum and issue a cohesive, authoritative
Fatwa which, in effect, denies terrorists who hijack Islam any religious legitimacy.
Selected Sources
1. Text of Final Statement of Emergency Conference of OIC Foreign Ministers,
Doha, 10 October 2001, As reported in Quds Press (international)
2. S Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, secretary-general,
Al-Khoei Foundation, al-Hayyat newspaper, London, 4 October, 2001
3. Personal Interview with Professor Akbar S Ahmed, Princeton, New Jersey,
USA, Winter, 2001
4. Dr S Parvez Manzoor, Islamic Legitimacy without the Testimony of the Muslim
Will?, Islam 21, August 2001
5. Khaled Abou El-Fadl, Islam: Images, Politics, Paradox, in Islam
and the Theology of Power, Middle East Report, 221, Winter 2001
6. Shaykh Fadhil Sahlani, director, Al-Khoei Benevolent Center, Interview (based
on his khutba, or sermon), Queens, New York, USA, 10 August, 2002
7. Home Secretary Meets Muslim Community Leaders, Home Office Stat 035/2001,
21 September, <2001
8. Sayyed Nadeem Kazmi, Islamophobia after September 11, Voluntary
Voice magazine, London, September 2002
9. BBC Online, UK, Summer, 2002
10. MacPherson Inquiry into Death of Stephen Lawrence, UK, 1997 (?)
11. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, European Union Report,
Islamophobia, 2002
12. Islamic Human Rights Commission Report, UK, 2002
13. Report of the Runnymede Commission on Islamophobia
14. Channel Four’s ‘British and Muslim Season’:A Case Study of Islamophobia
in the Broadcast Media. A Discussion Paper from the Forum Against Islamophobia
and Racism (FAIR), May 2002. Programmes covered in the study were: The
Hidden Jihad(Channel 4, aired Friday 8 March, 2002); Culture Clash
(aired Saturday 9 March, 2002); Mum, I’m a Muslim(Sunday 10
March, 2002); Trouble at the Mosque, Dispatches, aired Thursday
14 March, 2002); Who Speaks for Muslims? (aired Friday15 March,2002).
15. S Nadeem Kazmi, Muslim Responses to the New Terrorism and its Aftermath,
Speech at Leicester University Students’ Union, Leicester, UK, 12 November 2001
16. S Nadeem Kazmi, Workshop at Symposium on Global Ethics organized by the
Pacific Rim Institute for Development Education (PRIDE), University of California
at Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, California, USA, June, 2002
17. Daniel Pipes & Mimi Stillman, The United States Government: Patron
of Islam, MERIA, 2002
18. R James Woolsey, The Iraq Connection: Blood Ba’ath, The New Republic
Online, September 13, 2001
19. Dr Robert D Crane, Intellectual and Spiritual Jihad: The Ultimate Power
Against Terrorism , paper presented to the roundtable on The Role of
Muslim Intellectuals in the Wake of the Terrorist Attacks against the United
States, AMSS Conference on Religion and Public Life in the Global Epoch,
Dearborn, Michigan, USA, October 28th, 2001
20. ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force’ Resolution of the United States
Government, 2002
21. ‘Executive Order Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons
Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism’, US Government, 1999
22. Proclamation of President George W Bush, Declaration of National Emergency
by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, September 14, 2001
22. Washington Treaty, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
21. Frank Furedi, The New Ideology of Imperialism, 1994
22. Dr Robert D Crane, Challenging of Islam: Rethinking America’s Mission,
paper presented to the Plenary Session of the AMSS (Association of Muslim Social
Scientists) Conference on Religion and Public Life in the Global Epoch, Dearborn,
Michigan, USA, 27th October, 2001
23. Resolution 1373, adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4385th meeting,
28 September, 2001
24. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing
25. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Draft
Report of the International Law Commission, 2001
26. Frank J Cilluffo, Chairman, Committee on Combating Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, Homeland Defense Initiative Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Testimony Before US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
5 September 2001
27. The Hon. Richard Perle, Foreign Policy Research Institute Dinner, Washington
DC, USA, 14 November, 2001
28. Frank Furedi, The New Ideology of Imperialism, 1994
29. Voice of Bahrain, Summer, 2002
30. Dr Robert D Crane, Intellectual and SpiritualJihad: The Ultimate Power
Against Terrorism, paper presented to the roundtable on The Role of Muslim
Intellectuals in the Wake of the Terrorist Attacks against the United States,
AMSS Conference on Religion and Public Life in the Global Epoch, Dearborn, Michigan,
USA, October 28th, 2001
31. Statement of His Highness Shaykh al-Thani, at the Emergency Conference
of OIC Foreign Ministers, Doha, Qatar, 10 October 2001
32. One Man’s Terrorist, Christian Science Monitor, 2 October, 2001
33. Timothy Garton-Ash, The Guardian newspaper (UK), 10 November, 2001
34. Kanan Makiyya, comments presented to the international symposium,
The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq, Washington DC, 12th
October 2002
35. David Zeidan, Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups,
MERIA Journal, Volume 3, Number 3, September, 1999
36. Dr S Parvez Manzoor, Islamic Legitimacy without the Testimony of the
Muslim Will?, Islam 21, August 2001
37. Graham E Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, Foreign Affairs,
March-April 2002, v81 i2 p48
38. Text of Osama bin Laden’s taped remarks, aired on al-Jazeera satellite
station,8 October, 2001
39. Benjamin Orbach, Usama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines,
MERIA, 2002
40. Khaled Abou El-Fadl, Islam: Images, Politics, Paradox, in Islam
and the Theology of Power, Middle East Report, 221, Winter 2001Jean E Rosenfeld,
The ‘Religion of Usamah bin Ladin: Terror as the Hand of God, UCLA Center
for the Study of Religion, Los Angeles, California, USA, 2002
41. David Zeidan, The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial
Battle, MERIA, 2002
42. Dr Robert D Crane, personal conversations, Virginia, USA, January, 2000,
and miscellaneous texts, speeches and notes
43. Ayatullah Sayyed Fadhil Milani, Speech to the international conference,
Islamic Responses to Terrorism, Al-Khoei Foundation, London, UK, October 2001
44. His Royal Highness Prince El-Hassan bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, various texts, speeches and writings
45. Shaykh Dr Zaki Badawi, Conversations following his speech at the international
conference, Islamic Responses to Terrorism, Al-Khoei Foundation, London, UK,
October 2001
46. Soumaya Ghanoushi, The Origins of Extremism: Theology or Reality?,
Islam21, December 2001
47. President Parvez Musharaf, Speech, 12 November 2001, Islamabad, Pakistan
48. S Nadeem Kazmi, Only Muslim Leaders can Delegitimize Usama bin Ladin,
article published in The Tablet, London, UK, November 2001