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Islamic
Responses to Terrorism
Sayyed Nadeem Kazmi
[continued...]
THE
ENIGMA OF UBL (1956-2001/2?): DEAD OR ALIVE?
Graham Fuller correctly assumes that the
war on terrorism has dealt a major blow to
the personnel, infrastructure, and operations
of Usama bin Laden’s al-Qa’eda network. At
the time of writing, a mysterious audiotape
has been aired on the al-Jazeera satellite
channel claiming to be the latest message
from bin Laden, heretofore presumed to be
have died during the allied attack on his
hideout in the Tora Bora cave complex of the
Hindu Kush mountains in Afghanistan. Chillingly
succinct, the existence of the tape feeds
into another, growing phenomenon from the
fallout of the 11th September attacks
– speculation as to whether the enigmatic
Mr bin Laden is in fact alive or dead. Conjecture
in this area is obviously futile, so I will
not dwell. But what is worth considering is
the background of Usama bin Laden and his
previous known messages, which were videotaped,
not audio-taped. In perhaps his most famous
(38), bin Laden commented in the aftermath
of the attacks on New York and Washington:
“These events have divided the world into
two camps, the camp of the faithful and the
camp of infidels .. Every Muslim must rise
to defend his religion”.
It is clear from this message that bin Laden
perceives himself to be a legitimate Islamic
authority who can declare war, rally other
Muslims – and non-Muslims - to his cause,
and furthermore assumes his position to be
politically unchallengeable. Yet it is a position
that renowned authorities from nearly all
the Islamic schools of thought have unhesitatingly
rejected (see above, Introduction).
It is also clear from the statement that what
drives him in addition to his fanatical interpretation
of Islam in almost purely political terms
is an emotional anger against the imposition
of foreign forces on Saudi soil, perhaps a
reflection that his peculiar brand of Islamism
is tinged by an irresistible ultra-nationalist
agenda, a sort of post-Islamist answer to
the politically defunct pan-Arabism that held
sway over the previous generation of Arab
activists. The 1998 Declaration of the World
Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and
the Crusaders, said to have been issued as
a directive by al-Qa’eda, described the US
presence in Saudi Arabia as “a catastrophe”
that had humiliating and debilitating effects
on the Muslim people. Bin Ladin’s interpretation
of the US presence, and his solution, was
uniquely not only historically determinant
and retributive, but psychotic and irrational.
Throughout the Declaration cited above, the
emphasis is on power, authority and control,
which experts say is characteristic of a self-delusional
grandeur of a cult leader. That he refers
to his declarations as Fatwas is further proof
of his self-delusion, a product of being cocooned
by yes-men with guns and flattery. His
focus on the US is obsessive, and his ability
to dichotomize his position vis-à-vis that
of his perceived enemies is not untypical
of a cult leader.
According to experts (39), key elements of
a cult are deception and manipulation, as
well as adoration of a charismatic leader. The
latter in turn helps inflate the ego of the
cult member. Cult members, despite belonging
to a religion, are often not conventionally
religious, believing that rules and conventions
can be suspended by the enormous charisma
of their leader or organization. It is
legitimate to deceive and take advantage of
outsiders and even to destroy them. If
a charismatic leader and community can convince
a cult member that a suicidal act is the ultimate
in ego inflation, they can sometimes induce
it. Cult members need not commit suicide
as a pious act guaranteeing them paradise;
they might do it simply because they have
been conditioned to give absolute obedience
to their leader and been convinced that thereby
they will achieve some key goal that is highly
significant to their cults’ identity.
Bin Laden has been described as both Wahhabi
and Salafi in persuasion. Salafism (40) was
founded in the late 19th Century by Muslim
reformers such as Muhammad ‘Abduh, al-Afghani
and Rashid Rida, and taught simply that Muslims
ought to follow the precedent of the Prophet
and his companions (al-salaf al-salih).
Methodologically, Salafism was nearly identical
to Wahhabism except that Wahhabism is far
less tolerant of diversity and differences
of opinion. The founders of Salafism maintained
that on all issues Muslims ought to return
to the Qur’an and the sunna (precedent)
of the Prophet. In doing so, Muslims ought
to reinterpret the original sources in light
of modern needs and demands, without being
slavishly bound to the interpretations of
earlier Muslim generations. According to el-Fadl,
by emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam,
Salafis idealized the time of the Prophet
and his companions, and ignored or demonized
the balance of Islamic history.
But to understand the enigma of Bin Laden
more fully, it is necessary to enquire about
the religion of bin Ladin and to ask whether
it has more in common with movements that
arise out of a ‘cultic milieu’, which is a
parallel religious tradition of disparaged
and deviant interpretations and practices
that challenge the authority of prevailing
religions with rival claims to truth. These
upstart movements are dynamic and novel, but
usually short-lived. They adhere to an alternative
theology that they regard as more authoritative
than the laws, rituals, and interpretations
that define their parent religions. The cultic
milieu is the dynamic seedbed of novel interpretations
of sacred matters out of which new religious
communities take shape. The great majority
of new groups are benign. A small number mutate
into organizations such as al-Qa’eda that
justify violence as a theological imperative.
These ‘spectacular’ religions commit shocking
acts of suicide and homicide, and include
the religious movements of Jonestown, the
Order of the Solar Temple, Heaven’s Gate,
and Aum Shinrikyo.
Al-Qa’eda, therefore, appears to fit the definitions
of a cult: it indoctrinates its members; it
forms a closed, totalitarian society; it has
a self-appointed, messianic and charismatic
leader; and it believes that the ends justify
the means. The organization is expert in its
psychology. First, like all cults, it teaches
its members to subordinate their individuality
to the goal of the group. Then it demands
that they follow certain rituals. Members
are persuaded to give up their own lives for
the promise of a paradise.
Bin Laden’s personal history is also integral
to understanding his self-proclaimed mission
and the creation of al-Qa’eda. Born in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, in 1957, he was the 17th of
57 children born to a billionaire Yemeni construction
magnate whose company had become fabulously
wealthy on contracts to renovate the mosques
of Mecca and Medina. He spent time in Beirut
in the early 1970s living the lifestyle of
a playboy and was reportedly a heavy drinker
with a rowdy reputation (see Orbach). The
war in Afghanistan and the triumph over the
Soviet Union, a superpower, was a personal
turning point of redemptive proportions. Inspired,
he arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1988,
bringing with him donations for the war effort.
His Arab followers were trained by American,
Pakistani and Saudi intelligence services
who were funding the Afghan resistance against
the Russians at the time. Al-Qa’eda (lit.
The Base) was established in Peshawar a year
later as a service centre for Arab-Afghans
and their families and to promote Wahabbism
- the puritanical brand of Islam that had
historically condemned even Sunni Muslims
as heretics - among the Afghans. As the decade
of the 1990s began, and disillusioned with
the incessant in-fighting among the various
ethnic Afghan factions, he returned to Saudi
Arabia where he became a vocal critic of the
ruling al-Sauds’ decision to allow in American
troops to attack Iraq after the invasion of
Kuwait. He was exiled to Sudan, and moved
again to Afghanistan – now almost entirely
under Taleban control - in 1996, fearing that
his Sudanese hosts might cave into pressure
from the Saudis to extradite him.
Bin-Laden is thus not an impassioned revolutionary
radical seeking social justice for the poor
and oppressed (41). Nor is he the product
of harassment, imprisonment and torture at
the hand of Muslim regimes. Rather, bin-Laden
is a product of traditional Saudi Wahhabism,
enjoying riches and a privileged position
until his radicalization in the Afghan wars.
He focuses on Jihad in the traditionalist
political dichotomous sense.
JIHAD
“The manipulation of the concept of warfare
to mobilize followers into activism can easily
blur the distinctions between terms that symbolize
moral and spiritual battle, such as Jihad,
and their reinterpretation in specific contexts
to legitimize violent struggle excused by
an ‘ends justifies the means’ ideology” (Zeidan).
It is the deviant interpretation of jihad
as an obligation to kill unbelievers
that sets the Islamist terrorist apart from
Islam. In classical Islamic scholarship (42),
Imam Raghib divides jihad into three
categories: to fight against enemies; against
Satan; and against one’s own self, that is,
against one’s own greed and selfishness. He
maintains that the Qur’anic verse, “And strive
hard for Allah with due striving. He has chosen
you and has not laid any hardship in religion”
(22:78) comprises all these three categories.
Dr Robert D Crane refers to additional verses
in the Qur’an that, he says, do not use the
word Jihad in the sense of war but
in the sense of striving with wealth and one’s
own life. Indeed, he is emphatic in arguing
that Jihad is nowhere in the Qur’an “used
either in the sense of war or for seeking
revenge. Seeking revenge amounts to using
concept of Jihad for selfish ends even if
revenge or retaliation be for one’s own group
or community”.
Crane supports his view with Hadith literature
which prohibits Muslims from seeking revenge.
Specifically, he quotes Sahih Bukhari
wherein is contained the Hadith of Miqdad
ibn Amr al-Kindi who asked the Holy Prophet:
“Suppose I met one of the infidels and
we fought. He struck one of my hands with
his sword, cut it off and then took refuge
in a tree and said, ‘I surrender to Allah’.
Could I kill him, O Messenger of Allah, after
he had said this?” Allah’s Messenger (peace
be upon him) said, “you should not kill him”.
Al-Miqdad said, “O Allah’s Messenger, but
he had cut off my hands, and then he
had uttered those words.” Allah’s Messenger
replied, “You should not kill him, and you
would be in his position where he had been
before uttering these words.” Thus, in
matters of war Islam teaches a higher morality,
the essence of which is not to seek revenge
or retaliate. This transcendent morality –
which is incorporated into Islamic legal philosophy
- rejects the concept of retaliation and enjoins
the higher morality of pardoning the enemy
and magnanimity of treatment.
But according to El-Fadl (see sources), the
moral foundations that once mapped out Islamic
law and theology have disintegrated. The juristic
discourses on hostility to the use of terror
are no longer part of the normative categories
of contemporary Muslims. There are many factors
that contributed to this modern reality, according
to El-Fadl. “Among the pertinent factors is
the undeniably traumatic experience of colonialism,
which dismantled the traditional institutions
of civil society”.
In the Shi’a (Twelver, or Ithna’ Ashari,
also known as Imami) school of thought
(43), the word Jihad literally means
‘endeavour’. There is grand endeavour and
a minor endeavour. Minor endeavour means a
military campaign restricted by the imperatives
of the grand endeavour, though there is the
Jihad based upon pre-emptive and preventive
defence. However, any type of aggression
is forbidden in the time of the Greater Occultation
of the Awaited Saviour, Imam-e-Zaman, al-Mahdi.
It may be interesting briefly to consider
the view of Grand Ayatullah Sayyed Ruhollah
Musawi Khomeini (1902-1989), the much misunderstood
jurist and leader of the Iranian Revolution,
who had, through his earlier scholarly writings
prior to his political ascendancy, stressed
that man’s worst enemy is the lower self within.
Khomeini’s view was that it is useless to
engage in other Jihads before succeeding in
the Jihad against one’s own selfish desires.
ISLAMIC PERSPECTVES
From an Islamic legal perspective, the
requirements of justice are not just a necessity
they are imperative to understanding and tackling
terrorism from its root causes to its political
manifestations. According to many scholars
of Islam, terrorism in all its forms is antithetical
to Islamic law and society. Whilst Shi’a intellectual
scholarship has always been subject to a dynamic
process of ijtihad (juristic conclusions
based upon the requirements of reasoning and
rationality with due regard to the exigencies
of a changing world), contemporary Sunni legal
scholars often refer to Imam al-Shatibi who,
six centuries ago, developed guidelines for
developing and applying Islamic law (shari’ah)
in the form of a set of Islamic universal
principles (kulliyat), essentials
(dururiyat), or purposes (maqasid),
and explained that the number and inner tectonics
of these maqasid are flexible according
to time and place.
THE ROOT CAUSES
Terrorism has no quick fix solution, according
to His Royal Highness Prince El-Hassan bin
Talal, who goes on to argue that the only
way forward is a diplomatically creative policy
that will work towards conflict prevention
and conflict resolution through good management
(44). Prince El-Hassan talks persuasively
of “too many unacceptables remaining in our
developing world”, of the unacceptable level
of illiteracy (850 million throughout the
world), the unacceptable lack of access to
electricity for over a two billion people,
the unacceptable fact that thirteen million
people die from hunger every year, and the
unacceptable persistence of disease in parts
of the world whose victims are children as
well as adults.
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